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Corporate Criticism on the Internet:
The Fine Line Between Anonymous
Speech and Cybersmear

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the securities market has experienced a remarkable
period of growth and fluctuation that is largely attributable to the Internet.'
Currently, more than nine million investors trade stocks over the Internet,
and by 2003 there will be over 3.3 trillion dollars in online brokerage assets.2

The rapid increase of online investors can be traced to the availability of
information provided by the Internet.3 The Internet has allowed the average
investor to access investment information that was previously exclusive to
market professionals.4

Unfortunately, many of the same characteristics that make the Internet
such an excellent avenue for Internet users to obtain securities information
have simultaneously created opportunities for unparalleled tortious conduct
and rampant defamation "As the Internet continues to expand as a vehicle

1. See Mark Ishman, Comment, Computer Crimes and the Respondeat Superior Doctrine:
Employers Beware, 6 B.U. J. SI.& TECH. L. 6, 20 (2000); see also Nancy Toross, Double-Click On
This: Keeping Pace With Online Market Manipulation, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (1999)
(observing that many "investors routinely use the Internet's financial forums to seek prospective
investments and discuss actual ones."); ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481-82 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(observing that "[a]pproximately 70.2 million people of all ages use the Internet in the United States
alone."), aff'd, 217 F.3d 162 (2000), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct 1997.
2. See SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Technology Bytes the Securities Industry: The New
Millennium Brings New Investors and New Markets
(March
14,
2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch354.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
3. See Michael Schroeder, Growth in Internet Securities Fraud Will Be Difficult to Combat,
GAO Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1999, at C15 (projecting that by 2001 over fourteen million
Internet users will trade exclusively via online trading accounts).
4. Toross, supra note 1, at 1403 (articulating that "[tihe new medium essentially provides
individual investors with the informational resources traditionally available only to market
professionals."). See also Michael Moss, CEO Exposes, Sues Anonymous Online Critics, WALL ST.
J., July 7, 1999, at B1 (noting that "[u]ntil the Internet came along, the traffic in opinion about stocks
and bonds was largely - and for the most part calmly - controlled by Wall Street analysts.").
5. Toross, supra note 1, at 1403 (noting that these defamatory remarks both "injure[] the
legitimate investor and undermine[] the integrity of the securities markets."). See also Be Wary of
Chat Room Tips, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Feb. 13, 2001, at B5, (quoting Patrick McKeough, an

for both information and commerce, corporations have increasingly
confronted the problem of cybersmearing."' Posting false information on
financial bulletin boards or stock related chat rooms has sparked a new breed
of defamation lawsuits alleging a "corporate cybersmear."'

A corporate

cybersmear is a false and disparaging rumor about a company, its
management, or its stock that is posted on the Internet.' Although the
message is false, it can cause real damage to a corporation and be potentially

devastating to its stock value.9 The unprecedented power of the Internet to
disseminate information, either true or false, allows this new form of
defamation to spread like wildfire throughout cyberspace because "[ojnce
the rumor is posted in cyberspace, it takes on a life of its own."" In many

author and investment manager, as stating: ."You can get vast amounts of information for free on
public companies you may want to invest in. But it's just as easy to get false or incorrect
information, so you need to read critically and skeptically."'). Last December, the Ontario Securities
Commission ("OSC") obtained injunctions that shut down several Internet chat-rooms where
defamatory statements had been posted. See id.
6. Bruce P. Smith, Cybersmearing and the Problem of Anonymous Online Speech, 18 COMM.
LAW. 3, 3 (2000). "Numerous Fortune 500 leaders, including Microsoft, Ford, Wal-Mart, and
Electronic Data Systems, as well as a host of smaller companies, have been targets of online
criticism, ranging from blasts against environmental practices to rumors of financial mismanagement
to complaints about unclean restrooms." Id. Usually, Internet users post messages on message
boards that are exclusively devoted to a particular company. See Moss, supra note 4, at B I (noting
that Yahoo!, for example, "has several thousand boards, each dedicated to a single company.").
7. See Greg Miller, Online Power Gives David a Little Leverage on Goliath Internet: Unhappy
Workers, Consumers are Building Websites and Firing Off E-mail Like Electronic Grenades, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at AI (noting that tactics range from "the anonymous posting of messagesranging from personal attacks on executives to leaks of inside information .... ").
8. See Blake A. Bell, Dealing With Cybersmear, N.Y.J.L., April 19, 1999, at T3; Ishman, supra
note I, at 34 (citing Garry G. Mathiason, Cybersabotage-The Internet as a Weapon in the
Workplace: Internet Zone One, at http://www.profs.findlaw.com/networked-6.html).
9. See Laura DiBiase, Are Your Clients Smear-Savvy?, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22, 22 (Nov.
1999).
The rumors can be either good or bad, depending on the results that the author of the
message desires. A stockholder, wanting to make a quick profit, might post a false
message regarding a company's expected merger with a larger corporation. This could
temporarily drive the stock prices up, giving the author of the message time to sell his/her
shares. Even worse, a disgruntled employee could post a message accusing the company
or its executives of mismanagement could easily cause the stock to plummet.
Id. "A stock's price can be influenced within minutes of posting information on a newsgroup, a
portal's message board, or most commonly, on a Web site's message board or discussion forum."
Toross, supra note 1, at 1403 (citing Joseph J. Celia III & John Reed Stark, SEC Enforcement and
the Internet: Meeting the Challenge of the Next Millennium: A Program for the Eagle and the
Internet, 52 BuS. LAW. 815, 825 (1997)). See also John Reed Stark, Tombstones: The Internet's
Impact upon SEC Rules of Engagement, 12 INSIGHTS 10, 11 (1998) (describing the ability to
manipulate a company's stock price by creating a false "buzz" in Internet message boards and chat
rooms).
10. Garry G. Mathiason, Cybersabotage - The Internet as a Weapon in the Workplace: Internet
ZoneOne, at http://www.profs.findlaw.com/networked-6.htm (discussing the adverse effects
suffered by companies as a result of third party reliance on information obtained on online bulletin
boards); see also THE MAG. FOR SENIOR FIN. EXECUTIVES 20, March 15, 2000, available at 2000
WL 15330408 (observing that "[w]hat distinguishes a cybersmear from real-world smutch is that the
Internet acts as an electronic megaphone for mischief makers.").
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cases, "by the time such rumors are dispelled, irreparable damage to a
company's reputation has already been done."" Defamatory cybersmear,
because it is published on the Internet, is capable of reaching an infinitely
large audience and is easy to accomplish while remaining entirely
anonymous.' 2 Individuals posting false statements on message boards or in
chat rooms are capable of causing tremendous damage to investors who rely
on such defamatory statements because "the Internet's speed, low cost, and

relative anonymity give con artists access to an unprecedented number of
innocent investors."' 3
"Ironically, the anonymity that has contributed to the Internet' s growing
popularity is coming under attack."' 4 Presently, Internet defamation is
virtually impossible to control, and can circulate in cyberspace long after the
initial message was posted. Both scholars and practitioners agree that
"[t]he corporate cybersmear... is a problem that is out of control and is
likely to get worse."' 6 "[O]nce the 'news' is posted, Wall Street analysts
want reassurance; shareholders want answers; and the company finds itself

11. Ishman, supra note 1, at 34.
12. See Blake A. Bell, Reducing the Liability Risks of Employee Misuse of the Internet,
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM, June 1999, at 16 (articulating that "[r]umors posted on the Internet are
especially damaging because they are so easily spread."). "'The Internet has placed the power of
publication in the hands of anybody who owns a computer. But a lot of people don't understand you
don't have the right to go about and lie about someone with impunity."' Anick Jesdanun,
Anonymous Online Talk Faces Threat From Lawsuits, THE COLUMBIAN, Apr. 2, 2001, at Al,
available at 2001 WL 6282287 (quoting Boston attorney Victor Polk).
13. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Plain Talk About Online Investing, Speech at the National
Press Club (May 4, 1999), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch274.htm
(last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
14. David L. Sobel, The Process That "John Doe" Is Due: Addressing The Legal Challenge To
Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 2 (2000) (arguing that "anonymity allows the persecuted,
the controversial, and the simply embarrassed to seek information, and disseminate it, while
maintaining their privacy and reputations in both cyberspace and the material world."); see also
Smith, supra note 6, at 3 (reasoning that "[t]he relative absence of editorial filters on the Internet and
the lack of significant barriers" presents special challenges). Traditionally, media sources are
capable of screening publications for misstatements. Id. On the Internet, although speech is
comparatively unbridled and spontaneous, it seems almost more effective than traditional speech.
See Jonathan Zittrain, The Rise and Fall of Sysopdom, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 495, 10 (1997)
(observing that "in the real world individuals without institutional sponsorship or collaboration
cannot speak to the world at large. Not so on the Net.").
15. See Smith, supra note 6, at 3. "An e-mail or posting on a message board can also be
'republished again and again,' giving online communication the 'extraordinary capacity ... to
replicate almost endlessly."' Id. (quoting Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation
& Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 864 (2000)).
16. Blake A. Bell, Dealing with False Internet Rumors: A Corporate Primer(Sep. 15, 2000), at
http://www.simpsonthatcher.com/memos/art.006.htm; see also Bell, supra note 8 (noting that
"[s]ince June 1998, American companies fighting... cyber-smears reportedly have been filing one
or two lawsuits a week in Santa Clara County, Calif., the home of Yahoo! Inc.").

wondering how to regain control of its business reputation."' 7 In an attempt
to combat the problem, "dozens of companies are trying to flush out the
anonymous posters by filing lawsuits and subpoenaing records from Yahoo!
and other companies that manage the online forums."' 8

The gravamen of the cybersmear debate rests upon striking a balance
between the rights of corporate plaintiff's "using the discovery process to

pierce the veil of online anonymity" to pursue a legitimate cause of action
against the "significant privacy concerns for the average Internet user" that
has been named as a Doe defendant because of his defamatory statements.9
This Comment seeks to examine the emergent issue of the corporate
cybersmear and the attempt to strike a balance between corporations seeking
to protect or repair their reputations and anonymous speech protected under
the First Amendment. Part I of this Comment will address the underlying
First Amendment concerns involving restrictions of anonymous Internet
speech. Part II will discuss how corporations are able to sue John Doe. Part
III will discuss how defamatory cheap shots can cause cheap stocks and

17. Jeffrey R. Elkin, Cybersmears: Dealing With Defamation on the Net, 9 BUS. L. TODAY 22,
22 (Feb. 2000) (explaining that "[i]n many cases the bearers of such detrimental comments are
'virtual' unknowns and the damaged parties may face legal difficulties in finding out who they
are."); see also Greg Miller, High-Tech Smear Tactics! People with Consumer and Corporate
Complaints Find the Information Superhighway to be Their Road to Refunds - or Revenge, Hous.
CHRON., Feb. I, 1999, at A 1, available at 1999 WL 3974966 (quoting John Reed Stark, chief of the
SEC Office of Internet Enforcement, as saying "A lot of customers, clients, and competitors read the
message boards. Companies say that they are suddenly getting calls from major accounts asking
questions about the posting, as well as calls from the media.").
18. Miller, supra note 7, at A l. "Since the dot-com bubble burst, Internet law experts have seen
a steep increase in the number of 'John Doe' suits filed by companies seeking to unmask and stop
electronic critics." Laura Lorek, Sue the Bastards!, INTERACTIVE WK. FROM ZDWIRE, Mar. 12,
2001, available at 2001 WL 7347768 (suggesting that "[m]alcontents intent on bashing companies
on electronic bulletin boards may want to think twice before hitting the send key."). According to
Megan Gray, an expert in John Doe cybersmear defense, "'[o]nline privacy by Yahoo! is a
charade... Yahoo! will comply to any subpoena without considering the substantive or technical
legitimacy."' Michael D. Goldhaber, Cybersmear Pioneer, NAT'L L.J., July, 17, 2000, at A20
(quoting an interview with Megan Gray). The rising tide of cybersmear suits has markedly increased
discovery requests seeking to identify defamatory critics. For example, "America Online, the
world's largest online service provider, received 475 civil subpoenas last year, a 40 percent increase
from 1999." Jesdanun, supra note 12, at Al. This increase has caused companies such as AOL to
modify their policies for responding to such requests. See id. (noting that "AOL, which has always
had a notification policy, gives subscribers about two weeks to file a challenge" and "Yahoo!
implemented a policy last year giving posters 15 days notice, while Earthlink Inc. recently started
giving 10 days.").
19. Sobel, supra note 14, at 2 (observing that "[alrmed with broad warrant and subpoena powers,
law enforcement agencies are finding cyberspace to be fertile ground for the conduct of
investigations, often seeking the identities of anonymous users."). "Despite widespread use of Doe
pleading, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure undermine it." Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is
Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 914
(1996) (arguing that "[u]nlike most state court systems, the Federal Rules do not expressly provide
for any form of fictitious name parties."). In order to avert this problem, federal courts frequently
maintain that "an action may proceed against a party whose name is unknown if the complaint
makes allegations specific enough to permit the identity of the party to be ascertained after
reasonable discovery." Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995).
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provide examples of particularly notorious cybersmears. Part IV will
analyze the difficulty of proving defamation in cyberspace. Lastly, Part V
will discuss what actions a corporation should take in attempting to stop or
minimize the effects of online defamation.
II.

THE FINE LINE BETWEEN SPEECH AND SMEAR

A. Anonymity and the FirstAmendment

The Internet allows speakers to transcend far beyond the traditional
barriers of speech and permits communication directly "to an audience
larger and more diverse than any of the Framers could have imagined."2
Although it may be an overstatement to contend that a cybersmearer's web
posting "compete[s] equally with the speech of mainstream speakers in the

marketplace of ideas,"'" anonymous Internet speakers, nevertheless, possess
an unparalleled opportunity to disseminate their message in a manner that is
infinitely more inclusive than traditional notions of speech under the First
Amendment."
Frequently, cybersmearers "employ pseudonymous identities, and even
when a speaker chooses to reveal her real name, she may still be anonymous
for all practical purposes."" Thus, for better or for worse, the Internet
audience is left to "evaluate the speaker's ideas based on her words alone."'
Although such anonymity may, at first glance, appear to create an idyllic
form of equality in the realm of free speech, it can also serve as a shield to
hide behind, leaving a defamed plaintiff without a potential defendant.'

20. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (granting a preliminary injunction that enjoined the
application of 47 U.S.C. section 231, a provision of the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA" )).
See also Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring and Supporting a New
Frontier, II HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 437 (1998) (arguing that the Internet has expanded the
traditional "'marketplace of ideas' from the institutional dominance of publishers, distributors,
broadcast media, and other traditional gate-keepers of speech.").
21. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
22. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1086 (1995)
(arguing that "[t]he perfect 'marketplace of ideas' is one where all ideas, not just the popular or wellfunded ones, are accessible to all."). "To the extent that this ideal isn't achieved, the promise of the
First Amendment is only imperfectly realized." Id.
23. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49
DUKE L.J. 855, 896 (2000).
24. Id. (citing Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Disclosure: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 640
(1990)).
25. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy and Accountability: Challenges to the
First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1642 (1995) (arguing that "the ability to

537

The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the First Amendment "
to protect the right to speak anonymously,27 and maintained that anonymity
"plays an important role in fostering free expression."2 Although the
expressive nature of anonymous Internet speech has long been recognized
by its users, the medium had not received constitutional recognition until
1997.29 In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court was determined to define the
scope of First Amendment protection of online speech.'
The Court in Reno recognized that the Internet provides a "dynamic,
multifaceted category of communication."32 Further defining the scope of
online speech, the Court reasoned that "[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any
person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates
farther than it could from any soapbox."33 The Court concluded that there is
"no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied to this medium."," Rather, "'the vast democratic forum of the
Internet' would be stifled if users were unable to preserve" online
anonymity.35 Clearly, the Internet's veil of anonymity provides a forum that
encourages speech that may not otherwise have been disseminated.36 This

unique feature of the Internet, however, appears to entail both positive and
negative consequences.
remain unknown removes many layers of the layers civilized behavior as ... [Internet users] can
escape responsibility for negligent or abusive postings.").
26. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend I.
27. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). In McIntyre, the
Court, recognizing the "respected tradition of anonymity," observed that "even... the Federalist
Papers were published under fictitious names." 514 U.S. at 342-43 (citing Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960)).
28. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 (recognizing that "[t]he protection of anonymity... takes on
added significance on the Internet, a medium which provides individuals with unprecedented
opportunities to both publish and receive information.").
29. See Smith, supra note 6, at 3 n.7.
30. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), aff'g, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
31. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that "[tlhe Internet is not
a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller
groups of linked computer networks."), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
32. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
33. Id. (noting also that "[t]hrough the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the
same individual can become a pamphleteer.").
34. See Sobel, supra note 14, at 4 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870).
35. Id. at 5 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 868). Several lower courts have further established the
right to communicate anonymously on the Internet. See, e.g., ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029,
1033 (D.N.M. 1998), aff'd, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228,
1230-33 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Apollomedia Corp. v. Reno, 526 U.S. 1061 (1999), aff'g, 19 F. Supp. 2d
1081 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (protecting the anonymous Internet identities of Internet users using
www.annoy.com, a website "created and designed to annoy" legislators through critical online
speech).
36. See Smith, supra note 6, at 4 (reasoning that "pseudonymity can provide speakers with the
courage to speak in ways that they might eschew if their words were easily traceable to them.").
37. "Just as anonymity might give you the strength to state an unpopular view, it can also shield
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B.

Chilling Chat In Cyberspace

38
Compelled revelation of a speaker's identity can have serious costs.
Courts have long recognized the potential ramifications of requiring
disclosure of one's identity and the chilling effect that it may have on free

speech.39 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,0 the Supreme Court

observed that "[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority ....
It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First
Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliationand their ideas from suppression- at the hand of an intolerant society."'
Similarly, in Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com,"2 the United States

District Court for the Northern District of California sought to reach an
equilibrium between the plaintiff's right to pursue a legitimate cause of
action against concerns for the potential chilling effect of revealing online
anonymity. Confronted with this dilemma, the court observed:
People are permitted to interact pseudonymously and anonymously
with each other so long as those act are not in violation of the law.
This ability to speak one's mind without the burden of the other
party knowing all the facts about one's identity can foster open
communication and robust debate .... People who have committed
no wrong should be able to participate online without fear that
someone who wishes to harass or embarrass them can file a
frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court's order to
discover their identit[ies]."
Rather than haphazardly reveal the identities of anonymous speakers as
a means of silencing unlawful speech, courts have instead relied on the
speaker's audience to discern the content of the message." In doing so,
you if you post an irresponsible view. Or a slanderous view.

Or a hurtful view."

LAWRENCE

LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 80 (1999).

38. Lee Tien, Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV.
117, 144(1996).
39. See Sobel, supra note 14, at 5 (arguing "that compelled identification can chill expression.").
40. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
41. Id. at 357 (noting that "[t]he decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of
economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve
as much of one's privacy as possible.").
42. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
43. Id. at 578.
44. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348 n.l 1 (stating "[d]on't underestimate the common man. People
are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing .... They can evaluate its
anonymity along with its message, as long as they are permitted ... to read that message.") (citations
omitted). But see Jesdanun, supra note 12, at Al (quoting Miami-Dade Circuit Judge Eleanor

however, speakers are frequently able to hide behind a shield of anonymity
and create an uncivilized level of discourse. 5
C. FinancialBulletin Boards and Chat Rooms: The Ultimate "Marketplace
of Ideas," Just a lot of Junk, or Somewhere in Between?

"The Internet is a democratic institution in the fullest sense." 6 As the
Supreme Court explained in Reno, 7 "[f]rom the publisher's point of view,
[the Internet] constitutes a vast platform from which to address and hear
from a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and
buyers. 48 "[T]he fascination of the Internet lies in its potential for realizing
the concept of public discourse at the heart of the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence."" A prevalent metaphor and the central tenet for
the First Amendment public discourse is the "marketplace of ideas."5 "The
marketplace of ideas is a sphere of discourse in which citizens can come
together free from government[al] interference or intervention to discuss a

Schockett, in ruling that a "businessman's right to face his accuser in court was more important than
the defendant's right to remain anonymous," as stating: "'Give them anonymity and nothing holds
them back."'). A Florida appellate court affirmed Judge Schockett's decision. Id.
45. See Branscomb, supra note 25, at 1675-76 (arguing that "abusive" Internet posters should not
be permitted to hide behind a veil of anonymity); see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 382 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that restricting the anonymous distribution of campaign literature would foster
"a civil and dignified level of campaign debate."). But see United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1(1945) (stating "the First Amendment... presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be folly; but we have staked upon it our
all.").
46. Doe v. Hritz, Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Quash Subpoena to America Online, (E.D. Va. ), at
2, available at http://www.citizen.org/litigation/briefs/HritzvDoe.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2002)
(analogizing the Internet to "the modern equivalent of Speaker's Coiner in England's Hyde Park,
where ordinary people voice their opinions, however, silly, profane, or brilliant they may be, to all
who choose to read them."). See also Patricia Sabga & Charles Molineaux, Emulex Hoax, CNNFN
THE N.E.W.SHOW, (interview with Ann Kates Smith, Senior Editor, U.S. News and World Report)
(August 25, 2000), Transcript # 00082508FN-107 (discussing how "the Internet has done a lot to
democratize the stock market, but at the same time, it democratizes frauds and scams. There's a very
low barrier to entry to fraud and manipulation now.").
47. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
48. Id. at 853, 870 (holding that the First Amendment applies to Internet speech).
49. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 893 (citing Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public
Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103
HARV. L. REV. 601, 633 (1990)). See also Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public
Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 580-82 (1991) (arguing that freedom of
speech is essential to promoting the wide dissemination of public discourse).
50. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (stating that "'a central tenet of
the First Amendment [is] that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas."')
(quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 725, 745-46 (1978)). The "marketplace of ideas"
metaphor originated in Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The "marketplace of ideas" concept has remained prevalent
theme of First Amendment jurisprudence ever since. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969) (articulating that "[i]t is the purpose of the First. Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas ....
").
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diverse array of ideas and opinions." 5 "Scholars have touted the Internet as
the living embodiment of the 'marketplace of ideas' metaphor that lies at the
heart of First Amendment theory."5
However, "[t]his idealized vision of Internet discourse contrasts rather
sharply with the reality of the financial message boards." 3 Divergent from
the type of rational discourse originally sought to be promoted in the
marketplace of ideas, Internet chat rooms and "[m]essage boards have
become the 'Jerry Springer Show' of the Internet,"54 where communication

is more likely to resemble "'disinformation, rumors, and garbage"' than
rational deliberation." "Nevertheless, the boards are not useless as a source
of information. '' 56 Rather, message boards are useful to both investors and
analysts alike. 7 Moreover, from a First Amendment perspective, financial

51. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 893-94 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 893.
53. Id.
54. DiBiase, supra note 9, at 22 (arguing that message boards allow anonymous users who have
no credentials to "say whatever they want about whomever they want and the public will believe
it.").
On March 22, 1999, Thomas M. Gardner, founder of website The Motley Fool Inc.,
testified before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Government Affairs. ... For April Fool's Day, he and his co-founder
brother, Dave, decided to play a practical joke. They invented 'a fictional company with a
fictional product, listed on a fictional stock exchange and bearing a fictional ticker
symbol.' A fictional "hypster" promoted the stock by posting more than 50 messages on
Prodigy over a one-week period. The response from investors was amazing. "Some of
them frantically posted questions and stated they had contacted their brokers to buy
shares, but those brokers had never heard of [the company or the stock exchange]." Mr.
Gardner stated that the experience taught them several lessons. "First, it demonstrated
that there was an audience for humorous material about personal finance. Second, it
showed that some people will believe just about anything they read .... Third, it showed
that many people have not learned how to make informed decisions about their money for
themselves but will trade on tips, even ridiculous ones."
Id. See also Sam Ali, Lesson Is Investors Beware as Internet Hoax Sabotages Emulex Shares, THE
STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 3, 2000, at B1 (quoting Marc Beauchamp, a spokesman for the North
American Securities Administration Association, "For investors, the main piece of advice, the main
lesson they should take from this is to make their financial decisions based on homework and
research and not headlines.").
55. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 893 (quoting Reliable Sources: Are 24-Hour TV and the Internet
Helping People Understand Wall Street or Is There Too Much Bull in the Bull Market? (CNN
television broadcast, July 31, 1999), transcript available in LEXIS, Transcripts File). "As anyone
who has spent time perusing the financial message boards knows board discussions are no model of
rational deliberation and informed debate." Id. at 898 (arguing that "[i]dle speculation, unintelligle
musing, and 'off-topic' trivia predominate over serious financial discussion"). Cf Red Lion Broad.
Co., 395 U.S. at 390 (noting that "tilt is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail ....
56. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 899.
57. Moss, supra note 4, at B I (noting that "[sierious investors find merit in the boards....
'[L]ooking at and monitoring the boards is something [that] a prudent analyst has to do."'(quoting an

message boards contribute to the marketplace of ideas by encouraging and
empowering Internet users to participate in an unprecedented medium of
public discourse.58
The real problem lies in clarifying the boundaries of protected speech
and defamatory statements where there is such a fine line distinguishing
lawful criticism from cybersmear. " Although speech should not be
unnecessarily inhibited, because of the enormity of the potential Internet

audience, coupled with the devastating consequences of defamatory
statements, in some circumstances accountability is justified.'
False
statements posted on online message boards have caused the stock prices of

several publicly traded companies to plummet.6' Similarly, in March 2000,

telecommunications magnate Lucent Technologies Inc. fell victim to an
Emulex-like cybersmear as an anonymous Internet user posted a fake

earnings warning on the company's Yahoo! message board that was
designed to actually look like a PR Newswire news release. Lucent's shares

analyst with Warburg Dillon Read)).
58. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 900 (arguing that "financial message boards exercise a powerful
democratizing effect on public discourse about the publicly held corporations that shape citizens'
daily lives."). "But fostering a more participatory public discourse may come at a high cost. Speech
from a 'multitude of tongues' may lead to truth, but it may also lead to the Tower of Babel." Id. at
902-03 (citing Genesis 11:4 (King James)). Further, Lidsky eloquently articulates that "[a] discourse
that has no necessary anchor in truth has no value to anyone but the speaker, and the participatory
nature of Internet discourse threatens to engulf its value as discourse." Id. at 903.
59. See Toross, supra note 1, at 1422. "'There's a fine line between someone that wants to get
on and vent about a product or talk about what they think is going to happen, and someone who is
going to perpetrate a fraud." Tom Walsh, Taking on Cybersmears - Regulators Watch for
Manipulation of Stock Online, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 28, 2000, (Finance), at 25 (quoting Matt
Nester, head of the Massachusetts Securities Division).
60. Tort law has opted for the preservation of good reputations at the expense of certain aspects
of free speech. The conflict between these two vital interests in society rages through every
defamation case "in which our traditional notions of freedom of expression have collided violently
with sympathy for the victim traduced and indignation at the maligning tongue." ALLEN M. LINDEN,
CANADIAN TORT LAW 627 (4th ed., Butterworths 1988) (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE

LAW OF TORTS 772 (5th ed. 1984)). Foreseeing the potential the technological advances in the arena
of traditional defamation priniciples, Justice Linden observed that "[t]he problems in this area have
been exacerbated by ... the explosion in the technological sophistication of mass communication."
Id. at 628. See also Smith, supra note 6, at 3. For example, a rumor that apparel designer Tommy
Hilfiger had made a racist comment "on the Oprah Winfrey Show persisted online for many months,
despite the fact that Hilfiger had never even appeared on the show, much less uttered a racist
statement."
Id. at 4 (citing Howard Kleinberg, Destroying Reputations in Cyberspace,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES/FREE PRESS, Apr. 16, 2000, at F4, available in LEXIS, News Database,
Curnws File).
61. A prime example of how an anonymous cheap shot can rapidly make a cheap stock is the
cybersmear involving Emulex, an electronic company. Following a bogus press release to an online
news service posted by a former Internet Wire employee, shares of Emulex initially lost
approximately $2.5 billion in value. See Alex Berenson, Suspect is Arrested in Fake News Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. I, 2000, at C 1. On August 25, 2000, Emulex investors "got the financial shock of
their lives." Ali, supra note 54, at B . A 23 year old Internet Wire employee issued an early
morning bogus press release declaring that Emulex's CEO had been fired and that fourth-quarter
earnings were made up. See id. By 10:33 a.m., Emulex shares spiraled from $113.06 to less than
$43 per share, a sixty-two percent drop worth more than $2.52 billion in market value. Id.
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immediately fell by four percent before the company contacted the SEC and
requested that Yahoo! remove the false message. It is apparent, however,
that the financial messages boards constitute an important avenue for public
discourse and even fair criticism.62 At a minimum, financial message boards
and chat rooms educate both investors and non-investors about the nature of
the stock market and the behavior of a particular corporation. 6 Furthermore,
it appears that financial message boards and the stock market share an
almost mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship.' The problem, therefore,
does not lie in the message, boards,- but rather with striking a balance

between the preservation of free speech and the right of corporations to
preserve their reputations.
III. SEARCHING FOR SMEAR: USING THE DISCOVERY PROCESS TO
IDENTIFY JOHN DOE

Although the most profound affect of the Internet appears to be the
ability to speak anonymously, "it also increases the capacity to listen."6 As
technology continues to improve, companies are becoming increasingly able
to regulate defamatory communication.'
Surprisingly, for companies

62. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 900.
63. Id.
64. The explosion of increased number of investors which is largely attributed to the Internet, is
itself largely attributable to the rapid growth in interest and participation created by financial
message boards. See CHRISTOPHER A. FARRELL, DAY TRADE ONLINE 2 (1999) (arguing that "the
Internet has changed the very landscape of investing .... Trading stocks has never been cheaper or
more accessible.").
65. See Smith, supra note 6, at 4 (describing how corporations use the Internet to "visit the same
sites where their employees, investors, and customers vent their candid thoughts."). While the
Internet provides an unprecedented opportunity to speak anonymously, it also creates an
unprecedented opportunity to monitor every speaker and discover the anonymous Internet user's
identity. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L.
REv. 501, 504-05 (1999) (describing how the technology of the Internet is capable of monitoring
Internet speakers because their communications leave behind an electronic footprint which can be
easily traced back to the original sender). Thus, it appears that Internet anonymity may be more of a
perception than a reality, causing some to question whether additional technological protections
should be implemented to ensure online anonymous speech. See, e.g., David G. Post, Pooling
Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
66. See id.; see also Lorek, supra note 18 (quoting Christopher Reeder, a lawyer at Kaye
Scholer's Los Angeles office, as stating: "'People need to realize when they do the online posting
bashing of a company that they can be caught pretty easily."'). Concerned about the negative effects
of cybersmears, many corporations have sought assistance from both law and public relations firms
in an effort to monitor Internet message boards for disparaging information regarding their company.
Alternatively, other companies have decided that rather than attempting to combat the cybersmear,
to instead try to control it by registering domain names for containing the words "sucks," "ihate," or
"isnotfair," and have essentially provide a controlled forum for criticism. See, e.g., Smith, supra

seeking to eradicate online defamation, the Internet provides features that
permit accountability for such messages.67
Typically, Internet service providers ("ISPs"), online message boards,
and financial news chat rooms require that individuals who wish to
participate in the discourse through their service to provide their name and email address.68 In addition, at the time of registration, Internet users must
agree to the particular provider's terms of service." Because online
communication usually requires initial registration "with an Internet service
provider or an operator of an online message board, a corporation that
wishes to identify an anonymous online speaker can bring a lawsuit and seek
to subpoena" the speaker's identity from the provider."
Victims of this new form of defamation who have subsequently sought
to obtain the identity of anonymous Internet posters "have come to expect
prompt compliance from most online service providers, that now regularly

employ individuals engaged in responding to subpoenas."' In seeking to
quash the subpoenas, however, courts have become increasingly receptive to
the argument that the Doe defendant's online anonymity may be
constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.72 The gravamen of
note 6, at 4 (providing the example of "www.walmartsucks.com.").
67. See id. Routinely, "speech in cyberspace leaves an electronic identifier that, in many
instances, can be readily traced back to its source." Id. at 5
68. Id. at 6.
69. For example, Yahoo!'s terms of service prohibit speech that is "unlawful, harmful,
threatening, abusive, harassing, tortious, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, libelous ....
" YAHOO!
TERMS OF SERVICE, available at http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms (last visited Jan. 24, 2001).
Similarly, America Online's rules of user conduct prohibit speech that is "unlawful, threatening,
abusive, harassing, defamatory, libelous, deceptive, fraudulent... tortious" and that which is
"invasive of another's privacy .... [or] victimizes, harasses, degrades, or intimidates an individual or
group
of
individuals."
AOL.COM
RULES
OF USER CONDUCT, available at
http://www.aol.com/copyright/rules.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2001). Although these institutional
safeguards designed to prohibit defamatory speech are posted, the proliferation of cybersmear suits
suggests that they are largely ineffective. See Smith, supra note 6, at 8 (recognizing that "the
possibility of a self-regulated idyll, if ever such an idyll were possible, has long since passed.").
70. See id. at 5. "Although most online providers agree to protect the privacy of their
subscribers, the applicable service terms and privacy policies usually permit the provider to disclose
subscriber information in response to a subpoena duces tecum." Id. at 6.
71. Id.; see also Sobel, supra note 14, at 22 n.36 (noting that John Doe defendants do not have
the option of appearing pro se for two reasons. First, a personal appearance would obviously negate
a defendant's efforts to conceal his or her identity. Second, suits against John Does are frequently
filed in jurisdictions distant to the defendants. As a result, anonymous defendants who wish to
protect their identities are compelled to incur the expense of retaining counsel to represent them
(assuming they are able to locate counsel in a distant jurisdiction on short notice)).
72. Amicus briefs filed on behalf of Doe defendants by public interest organizations have
vigorously argued that online anonymity is entitled to protected under the First Amendment. See,
e.g., Mem. of Public as Amicus Curiae in Opp'n to the Requested Disc., Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. John
Does
1-4,
(N.J.
Super.
Ct)
(No.
MRSC-129),
available
at
http://www.citizen.org/litigation/briefs/dendrite.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2001) (arguing that "[i]t is
well established that the First Amendment protects the right to speak anonymously."); Def.'s Mem.
in Opp'n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. and in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ServiceMaster Co. v. Virga, (W.D.
Tenn) (No. 99-2866-TUV), available at http://www.citizen.org/litigation/briefs/virga.htm (last
visited Jan. 20, 2001) (arguing that an alleged cybersmearer's "consumer commentary is protected
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these arguments have relied heavily on the 1995 decision of McIntyre v.
Ohio Election Commission, in which Justice Stevens stated that "an author's

decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or
additions to the content of a publication, 73is an aspect of the freedom of
speech protected by the First Amendment.",

Distinguishable from the content of cybersmear cases, McIntyre
involved political speech in the form of anonymous campaign literature

distribution. 4 Several courts, however, applying McIntyre to issues more
analogous to tort cases, have held that limitations of anonymous online

speech constitute a content-based restriction that is subject to a strict scrutiny
analysis."5
Because "compelled identification of anonymous speakers
trenches on their First Amendment right to remain anonymous," attorneys
representing alleged cybersmearers have argued that divulging the identities
of Doe defendants should only occur where "disclosure 'goes to the heart"'

of the company's case, when all other elements of the cause of action can be
established, and when the company "has exhausted all other means" of
proving the element for which disclosure is deemed necessary. 6

The argument that a cybersmearer's identity should only be disclosed
when absolutely necessary to the pending litigation appears to be in accord
with the United States District Court for the Northern District of California

by the First Amendment.").
73. McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). "Although '[s]peech about
commercial or economic matters' takes a back seat to political speech in the First Amendment
hierarchy, the Supreme Court has nonetheless acknowledged that economic speech is 'an important
part of our public discourse."' Lidsky, supra note 23, at 946 n.301 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 787 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
74. See Mclntyre, 514 U.S. at 342-43.
75. See, e.g., Am. KKK v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835, 842 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (reasoning
that limiting anonymity "is a direct regulation of the content of speech or expression."); ACLU v.
Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (striking down a statute that attempt to prohibit
Internet users from "falsely identifying" as an impermissible content based regulation).
76. Smith, supra note 6, at 6 (quoting Mem. of Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae in Opp'n to the
Requested Disc., Dendrite Int'l Inc. v. John Does Nos. I through 4, (No. MRSC-129-00) (N.J.
Super.Ct.),available at http://www.citizen.org/litigation/briefs/IstAmendment/articles.cfm?ID=1859
(last visited Feb. 19, 2002). It is important to note that a court order, even when it is issued at the
behest of a private party, constitutes a state action that is subject to First Amendment limitations and
constitutional analysis. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). In
situations where a court order to compel production of a person's identity may threaten the exercise
of fundamental rights, those protected under the First Amendment, are "subject to the closest
scrutiny." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958). See also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960). The Court has recognized "that abridgement of such rights, even though
unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action," such as requiring
disclosure of an Internet user's anonymous identity. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461. Moreover, due
process requires a showing of a "subordinating interest" which "must be compelling" where
compelled disclosure threatens to significantly impair fundamental rights. Id. at 463 (citation
omitted). See also Bates, 361 U.S. at 525.
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in Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com" resolution of the issue. In
Seescandy.com, the district court observed that "limiting principles should
apply to the determination of whether discovery to uncover the identity of a
defendant is warranted" or merely intended "to harass or intimidate."7 In
order to make this determination, the court established a four-part test
requiring a plaintiff to: (1) "identify the missing party with sufficient
specificity;" (2) "identify all previous steps taken to locate the elusive
defendant;" (3) "establish to the court's satisfaction that plaintiffs suit
against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss;"79 and (4) submit "a

statement of reasons justifying the specific discovery requested."'
Similarly, other courts have departed from more traditional principles
and have attempted to reach solutions using the same technology that gave

rise to the controversy. For example, a New Jersey state court required "a
corporate plaintiff to post notice of its suit on a Yahoo! message board to

provide the alleged cybersmearers with the opportunity to oppose
identification." 8 Despite these innovative judicial measures designed to
strike a balance between preserving anonymity in the realm of free speech
against the right to pursue a legitimate cause of action, at least where the

77. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
78. Id. at 578.
79. Id. at 578-80. Several courts have required that before production of the cybersmearer's
identity is appropriate, the plaintiff must file a cause of action that is sufficient to withstand a motion
to dismiss. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online Inc., Misc. Law No. 40570
(Va. Cir. Ct., 2000) (noting that "before a court abridges the First Amendment right of a person to
communicate anonymously on the Internet, a showing, sufficient to enable the court to determine
that a true, rather than perceived, cause of action may exist, must be made."); Quad Graphics, Inc. v.
S. Adirondack Library Sys., 664 N.Y.S.2d 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1997) (refusing to compel disclosure
of anonymous library Internet users where no complaint had yet been filed).
80. Seescandy.com., 185 F.R.D. at 580. The innovative district court decision in Seescandy.com
appears to have evolved out of series of related federal cases involving unmasking individuals
engaged in anonymous discourse. Consistently, even prior to Seescandy.com, courts have applied a
three-pronged test in determining whether compelled disclosure revealing an anonymous source is
appropriate, under which the party seeking the identity must show: (1) that the issue on the material
is not only relevant, but goes to the heart of the case; (2) that disclosure is necessary; and (3) all
other means of discovery have been exhausted. See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Further, if the plaintiff fails to come forth with
sufficient evidence to prevail on all elements of its case that are based upon information within its
control, or where it is not necessary to identify the defendants, there is really no need to unmask a
John Doe. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 587 (1st Cir.
1980); Southwell v. S. Poverty Law Ctr., 949 F. Supp. 1303, 1311 (W.D. Mich. 1996). Some courts
have actually gone further than Seescandy.com and required that the party seeking discovery
information that is protected by the First Amendment will, in fact, help its case. See, e.g., In re
Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 6-9 (2d Cir. 1982); Pac. Gas & Elec., 71 F.R.D. at 39091; Cervantes, 464 F.2d at 994 (stating that "[miere speculation or conjecture about the fruits of such
examination simply will not suffice.").
81. Smith, supra note 6, at 7. (citing Mem. of Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae in Opp'n to the
Requested Disc., (stating "Public Citizen commends the Court for its sua sponte decision requiring
the plaintiff to publish a notice on the Yahoo message boards ... thus giving the anonymous posters
an opportunity to appear before this Court to defend their right to anonymity.")).
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corporate plaintiffs sole motive is to merely unmask an anonymous critic as
a scare tactic to quell continued criticism, the potential for abuse of the
discovery process nevertheless appears to exist. "
IV. How CHEAP SHOTS CAN MAKE CHEAP STOCKS

In just the past few years, more than one hundred defamation lawsuits
alleging a "corporate cybersmear" have been filed in federal and state
courts.83 In one of the many recent cases, the chairman of Talk Visual
Corporation settled a suit against an anonymous Internet critic, who had
posted false statements accusing the company's chairman of engaging in
fraudulent stock transactions, while using the alias "Rico Staris."' Pursuant
to the settlement agreement, the company's chairman "agreed not to enforce
the judgment as long85 as ...[the cybersmearer] did not 'attack him or his
businesses further.'
A. HealthSouth v. Krum: Exposing "IAMDIRKDIGGLER"
In HealthSouth Corp. v. John Doe,86 which became HealthSouth Corp.
v. Krum after the identity of the defendant was revealed, "7 a former employee
of the publicly traded corporation engaged in a relentless cybersmear
campaign against HealthSouth, its CEO, and even the CEO's wife, on a
Yahoo! finance message board, using the pseudoname "I AM DIRK

82. See, e.g., David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The Problem and
Possible Solution, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1207, 1210 (1995).
(Lawsuits do not exist to provide discovery for its own sake (or to provide grist for
publicity mills), or to punish (fair or unfair) by imposing the expense and disruption of
litigations, or even to provide an outlet for somebody's dissatisfaction with criticism.
Lawsuits are to vindicate a legal right.).
83. See Corporate Cybersmear Lawsuits, CYBER SECURITIES Law, at http://www.
cybersecuritieslaw.comlawsuits/cases corporate-cybersmears.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2001)
(listing and providing links to over one hundred "corporate cybersmear" cases).
84. Smith, supra note 6, at 5 (citing Talk Visual Chairman Michael J. Zwebner Obtains a Second
Lawsuit Award of $1 Million Against Internet Poster, Bus. WIRE, July 25, 2000, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Settlement Ends Litigation over Anonymous Internet Messages,
6.11 EPIC ALERT (Electronic Information Privacy Ctr. (July 15, 1999)), available at
http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC Alert_6.1l.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2002). See also Zwebner v.
Dumont, Dobry (a/k/a "Pugs" and "Spider Valdez"), Shepard (a/k/a "Rico Staris"), et al., Civ. No.
98-CV-682-M (D. N.H., complaint filed Dec. 10, 1998).
85. Smith, supra note 6, at 5.
86. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 866 (citing HealthSouth Files Libel Suit for Statements Made on
Web, SUNDAY PATRIOT-NEWS, Nov. 1, 1998, at B5).
87. Id. (citing Compl., HealthSouth Corp. v. Krum, No. 98-2812 (Pa. C.P. Centre County, filed
Oct. 28, 1998)).

DIGGLER." 8 The messages "ranged from relatively innocuous statements
about HealthSouth's 'self-serving' management to accusations that" the
CEO "was bilking Medicare reimbursement."89
The most egregious and bizarre postings, however, were smears
detailing a nonexistent affair that "I AM DIRK DIGGLER" proclaimed to be
having with the wife of HealthSouth's CEO. For example, one posted
message read, "I am dirk diggler and I have what [HealthSouth's CEO]

wants. Too bad I keep giving it to his new wife ...for those of you who
disapprove of my crowing about sexual liaisons ... lighten up. I am
practicing safe sex."9 The cybersmears prompted HealthSouth to file a

lawsuit for libel and commercial disparagement, and its CEO and his wife to
sue for libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress."
B.

"No Doubt the stock will plunge ....Time to considera major class
action suit."

In addition, M.H. Meyerson, a brokerage firm located in New Jersey,
recently sued alleged cybersmearers for posting defamatory messages
regarding "the company's CEO in an attempt to drive down the price of the
stock."92
Similarly, "Carnegie International, a Maryland-based
telecommunications company, is seeking $1.1 billion in damages, claiming
that [cybersmearers] posted defamatory messages about its executives ....
Comments, such as, 'No doubt the stock will plunge.., and 'time to
consider a major class action suit ... "' to drive down the stock price and
spark a lawsuit by shareholders. "

88. Id. at 866-67 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 867 (quoting Compl., HealthSouth Corp. v. Krum, No. 98-2812 (Pa. C.P. Centre
County, filed Oct. 28, 1998, att 13)).
90. Id. (quoting Compl., HealthSouth Corp. v. Krum, No. 98-2812 (Pa. C.P. Centre County, filed
Oct. 28, 1998, at T 13)).
91. Id. Lidsky concedes that these cybersmears "were at least facially defamatory," however
questions what the large corporation and its millionaire CEO stood to gain by filing suit against
Krum who was currently a food service worker at Penn. State University earning less than $35,000
per year. See id. at 867-68 (arguing that "it is not entirely clear what HealthSouth stood to gain by
suing him."). The logical answer to this question is simply that the corporation, its CEO, and his
wife, wanted the smears to stop. Id. at 876 (recognizing that "[p]laintiffs often seek vindication, and
bringing suit provides a means-perhaps the only means available-to announce to the world that
the defendant's statements were false" or they "may be seeking an even simpler goal: they may just
want the defamation to stop, and a defamation suit is the only legal tool available to accomplish this
goal.").
92. Elkin, supra note 17, at 25. Meyerson claimed that posted messages, such as "moneylaundering scums" and "I will cautiously short the stock," caused the company's stock to plummet
"from $21 per share to $4.50 per share amidst the post-message traffic." Id.
93. Id. at 26 (asserting that in many cases "perception is reality" and that companies should
attempt to reduce the risks that such rumors, falsehoods and innuendoes will rear their ugly heads).
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C. Southern Pacific Trading Corp.
Another recent company that has fallen victim to the corporate
cybersmear is Southern Pacific Funding Corporation." Southern Pacific was
forced to file Chapter 11 on Oct. 1, 1998, after its stock fell from more than
$17 per share to less than $1 per share after a series of false accusations were
posted on the company's Yahoo! Finance message board." The posted
messages alleged that the corporation's executives were covering up a
multimillion dollar embezzlement, borrowing money from shareholders at
high interest rates, exaggerating earning forecasts, and even purported that
the company was for sale.96
D. "The buyout deals do not work."
In 1998, PhyCor, a publicly traded physician management corporation,
filed a libel action against fifty Doe defendants for cybersmears posted on a
Yahoo! Finance board. 7 Of the more than eleven thousand posted
statements regarding the company, the alleged cybersmears contained both
elements of absurdity ("PhyCor is going to murder me!") and apparent
insight regarding confidential information ("Problem in a nutshell: The
buyout deals do not work.... .").8 Additionally, many of the posters
claimed to be current or former PhyCor physicians.9 PhyCor alleged that
the defamatory statements caused its stock to drop dramatically."m In fact,
PhyCor's stock fell from a high of $41.75 per share in 1996, around the time
when the smears first began, to $1.09 per share in December 1999.' °'

94. DiBiase, supra note 9,at 22.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Lisa M. Nijm, The Online Message Board Controversy Physicians Hit With Claims of Libel
and Insider Trading By Their Employers, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 223, 224 (2000) (citing Cathy Tokarski,
PhyCorMoves to Uncover Physicians' Online Identities, AM. MED. NEWS, May 24/31, 1999, at 1).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. In a similar case involving a biotech company, Hollis-Eden Pharmaceuticals, located in
San Diego, recently filed suit in San Diego Superior Court alleging that defamatory "slurs hurt its
business and reputation." Penni Crabtree, S.D. Biotech Sues Over Messages on Internet, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Feb. 3, 2001, at C3, availableat 2001 WL 6440781 (noting that the company's "stock

has fallen steadily from a 52-week high of $19.25 in March to [a recent] closing price of $5.09.").
Likewise, on August 3, 2000, a New Jersey Superior Court granted partial summary judgment in

favor of Biomatrix, Inc., a pharmaceutical company that manufacturers medical applications, for
defamatory postings on the company's Internet message board. Court Finds Anonymous Online

Postings "Libelous," 17 COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 31, 31 (2000) (noting that "[t]he defendant's
allegedly posted defamatory messages for over of year ....the messages stated that one of
Biomatrix's key officers was a 'Nazi' and that the company's products had killed product users.").
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E. AgriBiotech, Inc.

In a similar case, Nevada-based AgriBioTech, Inc., fell victim to an
online defamation campaign claiming that the company was on the verge of
bankruptcy and one its co-founders was about to be indicted for accounting
fraud.

2

Despite strong enthusiasm from market analysts, the cyber-gossip

posted on the company's Yahoo! Finance message board sparked an
immediate drop in AgriBioTech's stock from $29.50 per share to less than

$9.75 per share.0 3
F.

Contact Judy Gilbertof the Stock Exchange Commission

Perhaps the most ridiculous and humorous, absent its consequences, of
all corporate cybersmears involved the Diana Corporation. On May 30,
1996, an anonymous defamer posted a message on America Online's The
Motley Fool chat room seeking "anyone willing to 'cooperate with an
inquiry into possible violations of federal laws by [Diana Corporation
insiders or affiliates] using the Internet for stock manipulation purposes. '
Although such a commission did not exist, the message board post said to
contact Judy Gilbert of the Stock Exchange Commission's investigative
commission.' 5 Despite the ridiculous message board posting, Diana Corp.'s
stock plummeted, and, by March 6, 1997, had fallen from $115 per share to
$6 and 1/8 per share.1°
All indications suggest that these types of lawsuits will continue to
increase.' 7 Since June of 1997, victims of corporate cybersmear have "filed
one to two lawsuits per week in Santa Clara County, California, where

Yahoo! Inc. is based."""s

In addition, investor bulletin boards are being

102. Nijm, supra note 97, at 226.
103. See Blake A. Bell, Dealing with False Internet Rumors: A Corporate Primer, 2 (No. 7)
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC. AGE, Dec. 1998, at 1; see also Bell, supra note 8
(observing that "the AgriBioTech demonstrates Internet rumors can raise serious issue for companies
and their investor relations personnel."). Despite the damage that cybersmear has the ability to
cause, occasionally there is a humorous element. See id. "For example, a rumor that recently
circulated throughout the Internet suggested that Nike would replace old sneakers collected and
forwarded to the company by schools." Id. "Although it was false, the rumor prompted the return of
nearly 7,000 pairs of smelly shoes to Nike's headquarters!" Id.
104. Richard Gibson & Drew Ward, Cyberspace War Rages Over Diana Corp.'s Technology,
WALL ST. J., July 1, 1996, at B4.
105. Id.
106. See Larry Bauman, Small Stock Focus, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1997, at C7.
107. Nijm, supra note 97, at 228. In a similar cybersmear case involving biotech companies,
Genzyme Corp. and Biomatrix, Inc. became the targets of a massive cybersmear campaign following
an announced acquisition. See Walsh, supra note 59. Online critics posted over sixteen thousand
derogatory messages smearing Biomatrix, some even claiming that Biomatrix's leading product
actually killed patients. Id. Illustrative of a prevalent problem in cybersmearing, after the messages
were posted Biomatrix contacted Yahoo! to have the false statements removed. However, each time
the anonymous posters would simply re-enter the message board under a different pseudonym. Id.
108. Nijm, supra note 97, at 228. See also Epic Alert 6.06 (Electronic Privacy Information
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served with "subpoenas arising out of John Doe suits at the rate of about one
a day. '"' "Some estimate that there are acttally 'hundreds of these lawsuits
and only a few get publicized.""'"
V. USING TORT LAW To DETER DEFAMATION ON THE INTERNET

Companies that have sought to reveal the anonymous Internet users and
sue them for their false online messages have attempted to apply a variety of
legal theories to find liability, however, because many of these suits are
simply intended to stop the spread of the smear, few cases have been
litigated to a final judgment."' Thus, it remains unclear which theories of
liability will ultimately prove most successful. However, "[c]orporations
have increasingly used defamation suits as an offensive weapon" in their
efforts to combat the online comments of a defamatory critic."2

Center), Apr. 22, 1999, at http://www.epic.org/alert/EPICAlert_6.06/html (last visited Feb. 19,
2002) (discussing the statement of a Lycos spokesperson who stated that the provider receives
subpoenas on "pretty close to a regular basis.").
109. Nijm, supra note 97, at 228.
110. Id. In one relatively unpublicized case, Quest Net Corp., a large regional wireless Internet
provider, filed a cybersmear suit against a number of anonymous Internet users who had posted a
series of defamatory remarks on the Raging Bull Bulletin Board. Quest Net Granted Another
Injunction in Cybersmear Lawsuit, Bus. WIRE, May 8, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library,
BWIRE File.. Quest Net alleged that the posters, using the aliases "jollyr," "ADVISORY," "Cats3,"
and "gman007," had made numerous defamatory and disparaging remarks about the company and its
chairman. Id. The cybersmears ranged from personal attacks, bashing of the company's products,
uncertain earnings forecasts, and allegations that the company's filing with the SEC was suspect.
See id. According to Quest Net's president, the court granted a permanent injunction that enjoined
one of the defendants from using the "jollyr" alias to publish any future defamatory statements
concerning the company or its current and former officers, directors, and employees. Id.
Interestingly, however, the injunction did not appear to restrain "jollyr" from publishing any
comments under a different user name. See id.
111. Smith, supra note 6, at 5 (recognizing that "many cybersmearing cases are dismissed or
settled once the company identifies the anonymous speaker."). According to Bill Weisberg, an
attorney at Reed Smith, "[albout 98 percent of the cases settle out of court." Lorek, supra note 18.
Frequently, the primary motivation for companies in filing suit against an anonymous cybersmearer
is simply to obtain the identity of the speaker through the use of a subpoena, rather than pursuing the
cause of action to a final judgment. See Smith, supra note 6, at 5.
112. D. Mark Jackson, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff in the Era of SLAPPS: Revisiting New
York Times v. Sullivan, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 491, 491-92 (2001) (articulating that
"[diefamation involves a conflict. While the freedom to speak is an essential principle of personal
liberty, defamation law seeks to remedy the reputational injuries resulting from speech .... The
defamation suit has become a tool to ward off public criticism.").

A.

The Emergent Tort of Cyber-Libel

"In cyberspace, the power to defame is unprecedented."' 3 Thus, it is not
surprising that libel is the most common cause of action alleged in corporate
cybersmear cases.' 4 Within the past year, several companies have filed
cybersmear suits predicated upon online libel. In July of 2000, Credit Suisse
First Boston filed a lawsuit seeking one million dollars in damages as a
result of libelous statements regarding an analyst that were posted on the
web by eleven anonymous cybersmearers." 5 Similarly, in February 2000,
following a series of anonymous defamatory postings on the Raging Bull
financial bulletin board, Quest Net Corporation sued four cybersmearers that
were responsible for a barrage of false messages.
B.

'

Who Can Be Liable For Online Libel?

Initially, it may seem strange that the victims of corporate cybersmear
choose to sue John Doe, who would likely be unable to pay damages if a
judgment was reached, rather than the wealthier ISP or online news

boards." ' This phenomenon, however, occurs partly due to preference and
partly due to necessity. As a matter of preference, for many companies, the
primary goal in filing a cybersmear suit is simply to send a message aimed at
curtailing continued false postings."8 In addition, Congress and subsequent
court decisions have severely limited the ability to seek the comparatively
deeper-pocketed defendants." 9

113. Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The First
Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1154 (1996); see also Craig Martin,
Tolofson and Flames in Cyberspace: The Changing Landscape of Multistate Defamation, 31 U. B.C.
L. REV. 127, 127-28 (1997) (arguing that "to say that libel and slander are rampant on the Internet
would be an understatement.").
114. See Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 113, at 1154; see also Nijm, supra note 97, at 230
(noting that "'cyberlibel'. .. ranks as one of the most frequent claims made by publicly traded
corporations against anonymous posters.").
115. Smith, supra note 6, at 5.
116. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
117. See Smith, supra note 6, at 6. Instead, many smeared companies have "tended to view
Internet service providers and operators of online message boards as allies rather than adversaries."
Id. See also Norman Redlich, The Publicly Held Corporationas Defamation Plaintiff,39 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 1167, 1167-68 (noting that unlike traditional defamation plaintiffs who sue for psychological
or emotional satisfaction, corporations tend to bring defamation suits for business reasons).
118. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 858-60 (observing that "[o]ne of the most striking features of
these new cases, is that, unlike most libel suits, they are not even arguably about recovering money
damages, for the typical John Doe has neither deep pockets nor libel insurance from which to satisfy
a defamation judgment."). Lidsky argues that "[t]he sudden surge of John Doe suits stems from the
fact that many defamation actions are not really about money" [because] "[i]f they were, the
tremendous obstacles to recovery would almost certainly make plaintiffs (and their lawyers)
conclude that the game was not worth the candle." Id. at 872. Instead, Lidsky suggests that "libel
plaintiffs often sue because they believe that the social and psychological benefits of suing make it
worthwhile, even if they never recover a money judgment from the defamer." Id. at 876.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 145-6 1.
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1. Why Corporations Prefer to Sue John Doe: Hitsgalore.com and
Silencing "Mr. Pink."
Frequently in cases based on corporate cybersmear, there is a symbolic
aspect in bringing a defamation claim. 2 As one commentator has suggested
there may be a variety of reasons why companies prefer to sue John Doe,
however, the primary goal appears to be simply to repair the damage that has
been done.'2 Moreover, as Professor Lidsky insightfully observed:
Although corporations that sue John Doe may never recover money
damages, they still deem it economically rational to sue the
pseudonymous posters who make negative comments about them
on financial message boards. Corporate plaintiffs are at least partly
motivated by the fear that negative comments on financial bulletin
boards will drive down their stock price. The stock market trades
on information, and negative information shifts stock prices very
quickly. Hence, corporations must act quickly to offset the
potentially negative effects of defamatory messages by offering an
alternative version of events. Indeed, failure to respond may itself
be deemed an admission that the negative statements are true.'22
The corporate cybersmear case involving Hitsgalore.com is particularly
illustrative of this phenomenon.'23 On May 10, 1999, Hitsgalore's stock was
selling at $20.69 per share.'24 However, on May 11, 1999, Bloomberg News
service "reported, apparently truthfully, that a principal shareholder and
'founder"' of the company may be facing charges from the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") for false and deceptive promises that he had made to a

120. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 877 (adding that in some cases there might also be a profit
motive); see also Boies, supra note 82, at 1208 (noting that "[o]ne of the things that distinguishes
defamation litigation from most commercial litigation is the extent to which noneconomic motives
(i.e., motives other than to receive compensation for economic loss caused by the alleged breach of
duty) are operative.").
121. See Arlen W. Langvardt, Section 43(a), Commercial Falsehood,and the FirstAmendment: A
Proposed Framework, 78 MINN. L. REV. 309, 310 (1993) (observing that "[b]usiness entities have
become increasingly inclined in recent years to institute litigation as a means of vindicating
corporate reputation or economic interests when false statements have been made about their
products, services, or commercial activities.").
122. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 877 (internal citations omitted).
123. See id. at 878 (citing Compl., Hitsgalore.com, Inc. v. Shell, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C (M.D.
Fla. filed June 1999) [hereinafter "Complaint"]).
124. See id. at 879 (citing Don Benson, Hitsgalore.com Searches for New Life After Setbacks,
Bus. PRESS, June 7, 1999, at 7). Hitsgalore.com had recently experienced a market value increase
"from $53 million to $1 billion in less than three months." Id.
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previous Internet company he was affiliated with.'25 The report perhaps
incorrectly implied, however, "that Hitsgalore.com had improperly failed to
disclose the
FTC case to the Securities and Exchange Commission
26
('SEC',).991

The report sent shockwaves throughout the online financial bulletin
board community.'27 Angry online investors posted messages calling the
company's officers "crooks," "criminals," and "con men."' 28 "One poster,
'Mr. Pink,' stated that 'these crooks belong in Jail!,' and even dared

Hitsgalore.com to sue him [by stating]: [n]o disclaimer, this is not opinion
but a fact 29and if company doesn't like it, please sue Him; discovery will be
a treat!'"'

Hitsgalore.com promptly accepted "Mr. Pink's" offer by filing suit
against him and one hundred other Doe defendants seeking $20 million in
damages for "libel, tortious interference, and a civil conspiracy to defame"
the company and send its stock "'into a downward spiral.""' 3 Adding insult
to injury, in addition to the $20 million in compensatory damages for the
seventy-five percent plunge in its stock price, Hitsgalore.com requested
removal of the defamatory messages from the bulletin boards and sought
injunctive relief prohibiting future postings of a similar nature."'
Although there may be some financial incentive for corporations in
filing these suits against an anonymous critic, "[s]uing John Doe may also
be a victory if it silences John Doe."' 3 2 Furthermore, the mere threat of
revealing the culprit's anonymous identity may be sufficient to ensure that
no further defamatory messages are posted.'33

125. Id. (citing Complaint, supra note 123, at TT 30-31).
126. Id. (citing Complaint, supra note 123, at 31-32).
127. See id. at 880. "Discussions of the company on the Raging Bull and Silicon Investor bulletin
boards ... took a negative turn." Id.
128. Id. (citing Complaint, supra note 123, at 1 39-43).
129. Id. (citing Complaint, supra note 123, at 1).
130. Id. (citing Complaint, supra note 123, at 64).
131. Id. (citing Complaint, supra note 123, at 57). However, "[g]ranting this request would
almost certainly violate the First Amendment" as a prior restraint on free speech. Id. at 946 n.131
(citing New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 698 (1931)).
132. Id. at 880-81. Lidsky articulates a variety of reasons why it is financially wise for smeared
companies to file suit:
By announcing.its decision to file suit,,the company appears to respond aggressively to
the Internet rumor-mongers who revel in reports of its demise. Bringing suit sends a
message to shareholders and potential investors that they should not believe all the
negative information they hear about the company; it quells rumors and takes the focus
away from the negative press the company has been receiving - whether true or untrue.
Even if the company ultimately decides not to pursue its action past filing a complaint, it
may have won a symbolic victory simply. by suing John Doe.
Id.
133. "[I]t is perfectly legitimate for plaintiffs to seek to stop an onslaught of offensive and
damaging untruths." Id. at 881. In HealthSouth Corp., after obtaining the true identity of "I AM
DIRK DIGGLER," by subpoenaing Yahoo!, the cybersmearer's cybersmears ceased. See Bob
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2.

Why Suing John Doe is Necessary: Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act

Most victims of corporate cybersmear "would prefer to sue defendants
with deeper pockets than John Does typically have."' 34 Initially, many
companies sought to hold ISPs liable as "publishers"' 35 for the third party
'
In 1996, however,
Internet user statements posted on their service. 36

Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act ("CDA")'" which has
"largely foreclosed access to these deep-pocket defendants.' ' 3 8 Under

Cook, Down and Dirty: PhyCor and Other Companies Sue Anonymous Message Postersfor Internet
Mudslinging, MOD. PHYSICIAN, June 1,1999, at 30.
134. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 868 (reasoning that "ISPs are logical targets for defamation suits.").
"Suing the ISP frees plaintiffs from having to discover the identity of the person who posted the
message, and ISPs have plenty of money to satisfy defamation judgments." Id. at 868-870 (citing
David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
Upon Liabilityfor Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REv. 147, 174-75 (1997)).
135. At common law, one who "repeats" the defamatory statements of another is equally as liable
as the original speaker. See, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1980);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977). The republication theory of liability, however, is
subject to the general principle that the republisher must have taken a "responsible part in the
publication." Lewis v. Time, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, 463 (E.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir.
1983).
136. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995), superseded by 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1998). In Stratton Oakmont, a securities investment firm and
its president sued the ISP for libelous statements published on the provider's financial news bulletin
accusing the company of fraudulent acts concerning a recent initial public stock offering. See id. at
*1 (alleging that the IPO was a "major criminal fraud" and "100% criminal," that Stratton's
president was "soon to be proven criminal," and the firm was a "cult of brokers who either lie for a
living or get fired."). The primary issues in Stratton Oakmont were whether an ISP constitutes a
publisher, for defamation purposes, and whether a bulletin board content moderator acts an agent to
the ISP making it vicariously liable. See id. Examining the degree of control exercised by the
content moderator, the court concluded that the ISP should be treated as a publisher. See id. at *5.
In reaching this conclusion, the court stressed that the ISP took virtually no affirmative steps to
delete the cybersmears although it had "created an editorial staff of Board Leaders who ha[d] the
ability to continually monitor incoming transmissions and in fact d[id] spend time censoring notes."
Id. Thus, the court held that although ISPs are generally distributors, the ISP's "own policies,
technology and staffing decisions ...ha[d] altered the scenario and mandated the finding that it
[was] a publisher. Id. But see Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (holding that an ISP that exercises relatively little control over an online newsletter in which a
defamatory statement is published is not liable as the "publisher" of the third party defamatory
statement).
137. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
138. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 870 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. III 1999)). Section 230 is part
of Title V (§§501-509) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See Act of Feb. 8, 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.). Congress' enacting
Section 230 was largely a response to Stratton Oakmont, which many members of Congress
perceived as protecting ISPs that do nothing to regulate the content of communication occurring on
their service while immunizing those who make good faith, albeit failed, attempts to moderate the
discourse. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996), available in 1996 U.S.S.C.A.N. 124,
207-08.

Section 230(c)(1) "no provider or user of an interactive computer service "
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider."'4

3. Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
Subsequent judicial interpretation of Section 230 has further broadened

its already expansive scope. For example, in Blumenthal v. Drudge,4 ' the

court interpreted Section 230 to mean that Congress had intended to grant
immunity to ISPs, even where they "aggressive[ly]... mak[e] available
content prepared by others."'42 Analogous to Drudge, in Zeran v. America
Online, Inc. ,

the district court interpreting Section 230 held that ISPs are

immune from both re-publisher and distributor liability for the third party
defamatory statements of Internet users using their service, even if the
provider is given notice of the defamatory content.'"
However, at least one prominent scholar has argued that Section 230
does not completely insulate online service providers from damage caused

by third party defamation.' 45 Rather, it appears that an ISP could possibly be
liable under the language of Section 230 for third party cybersmears "where
it actually knew that the material posted online was defamatory and failed to

take any action, or in very limited circumstances where it failed to act
despite reason to know that the material was defamatory.

139. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)(2000)(defining an "interactive computer service" as "any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.").
140. Id. at § 230(c)(1). Additionally Section 230(c)(2), in relevant part, provides:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected.
141. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
142. Id. at 52.
143. 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 2341 (1998).
144. Id. at 1137; see also Doe v. America Online, Inc., availableat 1997 WL 374223, at *3 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. June 26, 1997) (following Zeran and concluding that "to hold AOL liable for negligently
'distributing' . .. chat room statements, as Doe seeks, would treat AOL as the 'publisher or speaker'
of those statements in violation of Section 230."); cf Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd., available at
1999 WL 477647 (High Court, United Kingdom March 26, 1999) (applying England's Defamation
Act of 1996 and holding that although an ISP is not the publisher of defamatory statements posted
by third party Internet users, the host can still be liable if it knew about the posting and choose not to
remove it from its server).
145. See Ian C. Ballon, "Zeran v. AOL: Why the Fourth Circuit Is Wrong," J. OF INTERNET L.,
Mar. 1998, at 6.
146. Id. But see Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that Section
230 eliminates both republication and distribution liability for OSPs and ISPs).
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4. Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co.
Even in circumstances where Section 230 might not protect an ISP or
online bulletin board operator from liability for third party defamatory
statements posted on their service, a recent case suggests that common law
may provide protection.' 7 In Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co.,'4 8 the father of
a boy whose name had been used by an online imposter to post vulgar
messages, filed a claim against Prodigy based on the conduct occurring via
its service.' 9 The New York State Court of Appeals dismissed the case,
concluding that Prodigy was entitled to a qualified privilege under the
common law, which protected it from liability for the transmitting of the email messages. 5 ° The court further reasoned that Prodigy was neither "a
publisher of the electronic message board messages," nor was it negligent in
failing to screen the messages earlier."'
Therefore, it appears that "the practical effect of these interpretations of
section 230 of the CDA is to leave Internet defamation victims with no deep
pocket to sue" as any effort to pursue re-publisher or distributor liability
against the service provider would likely prove unsuccessful.'52 "Instead, the
plaintiff must go to the source and sue the person who originated the
defamatory communication, even if that person is an unknown John Doe."'53
C. The Long Road To Proving Defamation In Cyberspace
5' 4
"Defamation consists of the 'twin torts' of libel and slander. '
Traditionally, defamation has been defined as the publication of a false
statement of fact that tends to cause injury to one's reputation in a
respectable segment of the community.'55 In order to prevail on a claim
predicated upon defamation, a corporate plaintiff must prove: (1) the
defendant published a false statement of fact; (2) the statement would tend to
cause injury to one's reputation; (3) the statement reasonably referred to the

147. See Smith, supra note 6, at 6.
148. 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1832 (2000).
149. Id. at 540.
150. See id. at 541.
151. Id. at 542.
152. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 871-72.
153. Id. at 872.
154. Jackson, supra note 112, at 495.
155. See Nijm, supra note 97, at 230 (noting that defamation "includes the torts of libel and
slander."). Libel and slander are generally proscribed by state common law and may also be defined
by statute. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 44, 45, 46 (1999) (stating that "[d]efamation is false and
unprivileged statement of fact which is defamatory, about the plaintiff, and published with fault.").

plaintiff;
"'
fault; 58

6

(4) the statement was published 57 with the requisite degree of

and (5) the statement caused injury.'59 The typical cybersmear case,

although distinguishable from the average defamation claim because it
involves a publicly held corporation suing a John Doe for messages posted
on the company's financial message board where the message pertains to
anything that might affect the company's stock price, nonetheless must be
analyzed pursuant to traditional principles. 60

1. Resolving the Constitutional Questions
At common law, courts considered defamatory statements to be lacking
constitutional protection.' 6 ' Nevertheless, the common law recognized
several areas of speech that were extended constitutional privilege.'62
Building on the common law privilege, the Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan 63 sought to strike a balance between the interests of free speech and

156. Although courts have held that the statement must refer to the plaintiff "to a certainty,"
Murray v. Bailey, 613 F. Supp. 1276, 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1985), most courts require only that the
plaintiff be "reasonably identifiable." See, e.g., Church of Scientology of California v. Flynn, 744
F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1984).
157. As applied to the Internet, a statement is published where it is posted on a message board or
chat room. See Giorgio Bovenzi, Liability of Systems Operators on the Internet, 11 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 93, 119 (1996).
158. A private figure plaintiff must only prove that the defendant published the statement
negligently. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974). By contrast, a
public figure must prove that the defendant published the statement with "actual malice," meaning
that the defendant acted with reckless disregard or "entertained serious doubts" as to the truth or
falsity of the claim. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). In such
circumstances, actual malice must be proven with "convincing clarity." See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 580, 621 (1976). A statement that is substantially
true is not actionable. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 516 (1991). In order to
be actionable, the statement must expressly or implicitly assert an assertion that is provably false.
See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990). In determining whether a statement is a
statement of opinion, the test is whether the average reader/listener would reasonably understand the
statement as a provably false assertion of fact. See id. at 20; see also Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d
1147 (9th Cir. 1995); Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Exam'r, 42 Cal. 3d 254 (1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1032 (1987).
160. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 905. For many plaintiff corporations, causation may be the most
difficult element to prove. See Nijm, supra note 97, at 231-32. Specifically, "[t]he plaintiff
corporation must show a causal relationship between the allegedly libelous statements and the
professed harm, which, in most cases, is a drop in stock price." Id. at 232 (citing Cathy Tokarski,
PhyCor Moves to Uncover Physicians' Online Identities, AM. MED. NEWS, May 24/31, 1999, at 30).
"Given the thousands of anonymous postings (both supportive and critical) found on a financial
message board," coupled with the volatility of the stock market, a causal connection may be virtually
impossible to establish. Id.
161. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (considering
defamatory statements to be lacking any constitutional value that fall within a "well-defined and
narrowly limited class of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem.").
162. Jackson, supra note 112, at 496.
163. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

558

[Vol. 29: 533, 2002]

CorporateCriticismon the Internet
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

"In a revolutionary
the strong interest of protecting one's reputation.
opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that defamatory publications
may be entitled to constitutional protection," ' 16' reasoning that "libel can
claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations." 66 According

to the Court, the protection of even defamatory speech was based upon a
"profound national commitment" to fostering "uninhibited, robust, and
67
wide-open" public discourse.

In defining the scope of constitutional protection to be afforded to Doe
defendants in corporate cybersmear cases, a line of Supreme Court decisions
have established three pivotal determinations: "(1) Is John Doe entitled to
the same level of constitutional protection as a media defendant? (2) Is the
corporate plaintiff a public or private figure? and (3) Is the speech at issue a
matter of public concern?' 68 The answer to each of these questions boils
down to how contemporary online communication conforms to traditional
defamation principles, or in the alternative, mandates their modification.' 9
a. Cybersmear: Diluting The Already IndeterminateMedia/Nonmedia
DefendantDistinction
Individual Internet users defy the traditional distinction between media
and nonmedia defendants.'70 On one hand, it appears that media defendant
status should be afforded to a cybersmearer, because Internet users are

164. See id. at 272.
165. Jackson, supra note 112, at 497 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268).
166. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
167. Id. at 270-72. The Court further reasoned that the occasional "erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that they 'need... to survive."' Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
168. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 905.
169. See It's In The Cards v. Fushetto, 535 N.W.2d 11,14 (Ct. App. Wisc. 1995). In Fushetto, a
defamation case involving false messages posted on an Internet bulletin board, the court, noting the
difficulty in applying state law that was enacted years prior to this new technology, observed:
The magnitude of computer networks and the consequent communications possibilities
were non-existent at the time this statute was enacted. Applying the present libel laws to
cyberspace or computer networks entails rewriting statutes that were written to manage
physical, printed objects, not computer networks or services. Consequently, it is for the
legislature to address the increasingly common phenomenon of libel and defamation on
the information superhighway.
Id. (holding that a message posted on an Internet bulletin board is not a publication at regular
intervals, unlike a newspaper, and thus the plaintiff was not required to provide the defendant with
the opportunity to retract the statement, which is required under Wisconsin state law).
170. See Michael Hadley, Note, The Gertz Doctrine and Internet Defamation, 84 VA. L. REV.
477, 487 (1996) (concluding that "most speakers on the Internet could not properly be described as
the 'press."').
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similar to mainstream media defendants, and because the Internet, like
traditional forms of media, has the ability to reach such a massive
audience. 7'
The Supreme Court, however, has traditionally applied media defendant
protection under the First Amendment exclusively to institutional forms of
media such as newspaper publishers and broadcasters."' Thus, although it is
unlikely that Internet users like John Doe would be considered traditional
media defendants, the issue of whether Internet users should be afforded the

same level of constitutional protection under the First Amendment, as their
more mainstream media counterparts, remains unresolved.'
The "best
educated guess,"'7

however, of both scholars' 5 and lower court opinions,

indicates that nonmedia and media defendants are entitled to an equal level
of constitutional protection for defamatory statements.' 6
Given the practical implications of online speech, however, the
distinction becomes rather irrelevant because, as the Court noted in

Branzburg v. Hayes,'77 the "lonely pamphleteer' s" impact to public discourse

can rival even the most powerful of all media speakers. 8 Moreover, in Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,'79 the majority of the Court
seemingly rejected the media/nonmedia distinction altogether.'80 Thus,
171. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 905.
172. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (applying the media defendant
to a newspaper publisher); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (analyzing
a newspaper publisher under the media defendant standard of constitutional protection); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (limiting the media defendant standard exclusively to
publishers and broadcasters).
173. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 906 (arguing "[tihe Supreme Court has studiously avoided
providing a definitive resolution to this question .... ").
174. See Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic
Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1564 (1987) (arguing that "[t]he
best educated guess ... is that the Court will ultimately reject the media/nonmedia distinction.").
175. See, e.g., Developments in the Law - The Long Arm of Cyber-Reach, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1610, 1616 n.50 (1998) (recognizing that "[a]lthough guilty of giving mixed signals," the Court has
"confirmed the irrelevance of the media/nonmedia distinction .. "); Anne Benaroya, Note,
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps Revisited: A Critical Approach to Different Standards of
Protectionfor Media and Nonmedia Defendants in Private Plaintiff Defamation Cases, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1268, 1270 (1990) (contending "that the defamation defendant's status as part of the
institutional media should have no bearing on whether, and to what degree, the defendant should
receive constitutional protection.").
176. See JOHN B. MCCRORY & ROBERT C. BERNIUS, CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE INLIBEL LAW,
I COMMUNICATIONS LAW 7, 464-73 (Practising Law Institute Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-398, 1994). Generally, most lower courts have
abandoned the media/nonmedia distinction, in favor of requiring that public figures or public
officials prove actual malice regardless of the level of constitutional protection to be afforded to the
defendant's status. See id. at 465-71.
177. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
178. See id. at 704.
179. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
180. See id. at 783-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that "at least six Members of this Court...
agree today that, in the context of defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater
and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same
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although it is unlikely that an Internet speaker would be considered a media
defendant, it is correlatively unlikely that they would receive any varying
level of constitutional protection for their allegedly defamatory statements.''
b. Are CorporationsPublic or PrivateFigures?
"[T]he Supreme Court has yet to establish the status of corporate
defamation plaintiffs."'82 Since corporations "are not so much real entities as
they are simply means of structuring financial transactions," many
corporations fail to neatly conform to either the private or public figure
classification.'83 In the typical corporate cybersmear case, the "plaintiff is a
publicly held corporation listed on a national stock exchange;" however,
although the corporation is "publicly held," it is not necessarily a public

figure."'
The distinction between public and private figures is crucial, because a
public figure plaintiff must prove that the defendant published the
defamatory statement with actual malice, in reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the claim, in order to recover. '" Although distinguishing public
and private figure status is necessary to establish the requisite level of intent
to find liability and is often hazy, the distinction becomes especially difficult
where a corporate plaintiff is involved' 86

In Gertz v. Welch, Inc.,'87 the

activities."). In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Powell, the Court held that, in cases
involving private figure plaintiffs and statements of public concern, states may award presumed and
punitive damages for defamatory statements absent a showing of actual malice. See id. at 764.
181. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 907 (predicting that is seems "unlikely that the Supreme Court
will extend less First Amendment protection to Internet users than it has extended to traditional
media defendants."); see also Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998) (arguing that "[w]ith few exceptions, constitutionalized
defamation law applies the same principles to a libel in the New York Times as it does to slander
over the back fence.").
182. Jackson, supra note 112, at 502.
183. Matthew D. Bunker, The Corporate Plaintiff as Public Figure, 72 JOURNALISM & MASS
COMM. Q. 597, 598 (1995).
184. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 908 (arguing that "[a] strong argument can be made that the typical
corporate plaintiff in a John Doe libel case will be a public figure."). Professor Lidsky argues that
corporations should be treated as public figures where the alleged defamatory statements are posted
"in a forum dedicated to discussion of the corporation's management and operation" and are
"reasonably related to that subject." Id.
185. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967) (holding that public figures must
prove actual malice in order to prevail). The heightened standard of actual malice requires that
plaintiffs prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant published the defamatory
statement with either knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
claim. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1134
(1986).
186. See, e.g., Rosanova v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (noting
that distinguishing private and public figures "is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall."),

Supreme Court set forth two critical factors for determining public figure'8
status: (1) whether the plaintiff had access to channels of communication to
rebut the defamatory statement;' 89 and (2) whether the plaintiff had
voluntarily assumed a prominent role in a public controversy, and the
accompanying risk of heightened public scrutiny. '
As applied to the typical cybersmear case, corporations clearly have the
ability to rebut defamatory statements by using numerous channels of
communication, including the use of the very technology on which the
statement was published; however, securities laws pertaining to selective
disclosure largely preclude corporations from actually being able to use such

channels of communication to rebut false accusations.19' Moreover, the
"public controversy" requirement appears to be lacking in most cases of

corporate cybersmear.' 92 Nevertheless, courts have held that a listing on a
national stock exchange is sufficient to confer public figure status.' 93
affid, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978); Patricia Nassif Fetzer, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as
First Amendment "Public Figure": Nailing the Jellyfish," 68 IOWA L. REV. 35 (1982) (discussing
the difficulty of distinguishing the difference between private and public figures where a defamed
corporate plaintiff is involved). Other courts have similarly suggested that the elusive "distinction
between corporations and individuals is one without a difference." Trans World Accounts, Inc. v.
Assoc. Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D. Cal. 1977). In addition, some courts have concluded that
a corporation should not be considered a public figure where commercial speech is involved. See
Bunker, supra note 183, at 602. These courts have reasoned that if the defamatory statement stems
from commercial speech, then the corporation is not subject to the actual malice standard. See
Healthcare v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 933 (3d Cir. 1990).
187. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
188. There are three types of public figures: (1)involuntary public figures; (2) general-purpose
public figures; and (3) limited-purpose public figures. See id. at 351-52; see also Barry v. Time,
Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Dameron v. Wash. Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
189. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (stating that "[p]ublic figures and public officials usually enjoy
significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy."). With
this in mind, a strong argument could be made that publicly held corporations should be treated a
private figures. Although corporate plaintiffs that have been cybersmeared will almost invariably
have access to such "effective channels of communication" and the ability to rebut the defamatory
statements, it is not clear that corporations are allowed to do so. Distinguishable from the situation
where "some bozo writes one hundred lines of point by point innuendo about you and your sex life
or personal habits, [and] you can write five hundred lines of point by point refutation," MIKE
GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS 77, 82 (1998). In many cases, smeared corporations, unlike private
individuals, are forced to remain silent for fear that response may give rise to allegations of selective
disclosure. See Robert A. Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities
Fraud, and Rule 1O(b)5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1, 77 (1998) (discussing potential liability for selective
disclosure by responding to false rumors).
190. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45.
191. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 912 (noting that "many corporations... monitor board
discussions, and they may sometimes take an active role in shaping the discussion to their benefit.").
But see Prentice, supra note 189, at 77 (arguing that response to rumors could give rise to liability
for selective disclosure).
192. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 910 (observing that:
[tihe "public controversy" at issue will ordinarily be a topic that affects the corporation's
stock price: it may be as diffuse a subject as the overall financial health of the corporation
or as specific as a particular venture on which the company has embarked or a particular
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"Despite the lack of a true 'controversy,"' there are some justifications

for applying the public figure standard to publicly held corporations.'94 For
example, "[i]n making the decision to 'go public,' the corporation seeks and
often obtains national recognition," and "voluntarily submits itself both to
extensive legal regulation (including public disclosure requirements) and to
a degree of public scrutiny."'95 Therefore, whether a corporation should be
considered a private or public figure appears to entail a fact-intensive
inquiry, rather than an absolute classification, depending on the nature of the

company and the degree to which it has injected itself into the public
realm.
c.

96

Is FinancialConcern the Same as Public Concern?

The Supreme Court has "long recognized that not all speech is of equal
First Amendment importance.""'9 Rather, heightened protection under the
First Amendment is solely applicable to "speech on 'matters of public

concern."" 9' "Whether speech deals with a matter of public concern is not
judged by its subject matter alone, but by its 'content, form, and context."""
It seems logical that most cybersmears do not involve matters of public
concern because "most of those who follow the message board for a

corporate decision. The problem with applying this analysis to the John Doe cases is that
they do not tend to involve a "controversy" but rather a subject of discussion).
193. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (S.D.N.Y 1977) (holding
that a publicly held corporation's "role in society is such that it is a figure generally in the public
eye.").
194. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 911 (distinguishing privately and publicly held corporations and
reasoning that the public figure status is proper for "publicly held corporations [because they] are
more likely to 'invite attention and comment' on their business dealings and affairs by their
affirmative acts.").
195. Id. (citing ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA L. BARRON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS, § 5.3.8 274 (2d ed. 1994)).
196. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA
LAW 196, 311 (5th ed. 1995) (noting that "[t]he overwhelming majority of courts have concluded
that the fact of incorporation alone does not make the plaintiff a public figure."); cf Lidsky, supra
note 23, at 912 (arguing that "courts should ordinarily treat corporations as having assumed the risk
of hard-hitting debate and criticism of their activities.").
197. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1990) (plurality
opinion); see also Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350-51 (1974) (holding that a private figure
may not recover punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice for a statement involving a
matter of public concern, a showing of negligence, is however, sufficient to recover for actual
injury).
198. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758 (noting that little First Amendment protection is afforded
to speech involving matters of private concern (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
776 (1978) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama., 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940)))).
199. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 913 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).

particular corporation will be investors or potential investors who have selfinterested motives for following the discussion."2 '
On February 23, 2001, in Global Telemedia International v. Does 1
through 35,20' however, the district court found allegedly defamatory

statements referring to a publicly held company to constitute a matter of
public interest because the company had "inserted itself into the public arena
and made itself a matter of public interest by means of numerous press
releases issued . ,.0' In addition, Judge Carter further articulated that "a
publicly traded company with many thousands of individual investors is of
public interest because its successes or failures will affect not only investors,
but in the case of large companies, potentially market sectors or the markets
as a whole.""2 3 Thus, it appears that whether allegedly defamatory
cybersmears qualify as matters of purely public or private concern is not
conducive to a blanket categorization. Instead, courts should analyze the
statements on a case-by-case basis.
d. Proving a Malicious Smear was Posted With Actual Malice

In St. Amant v. Thompson,1 ' the Supreme Court held that in order to
establish actual malice, "[t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication."2 5" Unlike the typical anonymous Internet message

poster, "Itlhe Supreme Court's examples of what constitutes actual malice
are geared to the investigative practices of the institutional press. ' '2° In stark
200. Id. at 914 (arguing that "this argument overstates the extent to which the message boards
involve speech that is 'solely in the individual interest of the speaker and [his] specific business
audience."'). This counter-argument, however, seems to confuse protected speech with a
defamatory cybersmear and presuppose that a false and disparaging statement actually constitutes a
"useful source information." Id. Clearly, Professor Lidsky is correct in stating that "[t]he financial
message boards can be a useful source of information," id. at 914, and "can provide an informal
education to investors and noninvestors alike .
I..."
Id. at 914-15. However, the operative word in
both those arguments is "can." Where message boards and chat rooms are used to perpetrate
cybersmear they simply do not achieve these attributes. Rather, it is difficult to envision how false
and disparaging "disinformation, rumors, and garbage," do, in fact, provide either an educational or
useful source information.
201. 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
202. Id. at 1265 (citing Gray Decl., Ex. P at 97; Ex. Q. at 112; Ex. R at 122; Ex. T. at 127-49; Ex.
U at 150-53; Stevens Decl. (Opp'n to Reader Mem.), Ex. D at 5).
203. Id. (adding that "[t]he fact that a chat-room dedicated to GTMI has generated over 30,000
postings further indicates that the company is of public interest.").
204. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
205. Id. at 73 1.
206. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 918 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 12-12, at 871 (2d ed. 1998) which claims that, "[in the world of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, ignorance is bliss"). "Actual malice may be found, for example, where the defendant
invents a story ... publishes information 'so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would
have put [it] in circulation,' or where the defendant publishes despite 'obvious reasons to doubt the
veracity of [an] informant or the accuracy of his reports."' Id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 732 (1968)).
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contrast to the routine investigative practices of the press, "[njo professional
ethic impels [a cybersmearer] to be accurate., 02 7 Rather, "the culture of the
boards encourages just the opposite. 22 Thus, because a cybersmearer "is
more likely than the average media defendant to be reckless ...with regard
to the accuracy of the facts he publishes on Internet financial bulletin
boards," it may be relatively easy for plaintiff corporations to carry their
heavy burden of establishing actual malice."°
e.

Opinion and Cybersmear:Have Modems and Message Boards
Modified Milkovich?

In Gertz v. Welch, Inc., ' the Supreme Court stated that "[u]nder the
First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious
an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. 2
The First
Amendment affords a privilege to mere statements of opinion that do not
imply a provably false assertion "because such statements 'cannot
[reasonably] be interpreted as stating actual facts."' 2 12
Frequently,
defendants forced to litigate a corporate cybersmear suit argue that "the
spontaneous bursts of speech dispatched" onto the Internet more "closely
resemble gossip, rumor 'buzz,' and opinion rather than verifiable factual
statements. 2 3 Moreover, courts have acknowledged that "'words have
different meanings depending on the context in which they are used."' 4

207. Id. (citing JAY BLACK ET AL., DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM: A HANDBOOK WITH CASE
STUDIES (1997)).
208. Id. (arguing that "[tihe boards prize speed over accuracy on the assumption that the reader
will be able to sort reason from rhetoric and fact from fiction."). As the many cybersmear cases
illustrate, however, the assumption that the Internet audience will automatically be able to
differentiate truth from fiction implies a type of knowledge that many online investors simply do not
have. See DiBiase, supra note 9, at 22 (arguing that message boards allow anonymous users who
have no credentials to "say whatever about whomever they want and the public will believe it.").
209. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 919.
210. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
211. Id. at 339-40.
212. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 919 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20
(1990). Pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a statement of opinion is actionable "only if
it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 illus. 4 & 5 (1977). Under Oillman v. Evans, 750 F,2d
970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), a statement of fact is one that is "capable of being objectively
characterized as true or false." Id. at 979. As both courts and litigants have realized, however,
differentiating statements of fact and statements of opinion is "by no means as easy a question as
might appear at first blush." Id. at 975.
213. Smith, supra note 6, at 8 (citing Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Special Mot. to Strike, Thomas
& Betts Corp. v. Does I through 50, No. GIC 748128 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000), available at
http://www.citizen.org/litigation/briefs/sandiego.htm (last visited July 12, 2000)). In Thomas &

Under Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,2 ' a statement that is published
in a forum where the audience would reasonably expect to find verifiable
assertions of fact is more likely to be considered a statement of fact.2 6
Alternatively, a statement that is uttered in a forum where the audience
expects "to find gossip, rumors, or 'buzz' is more likely to be construed as
opinion, and thus nonactionable." 2 7
Therefore, whether the opinion
privilege applies to corporate cybersmear depends not only on whether the
statement is couched in language suggesting that it is provably false or
containing undisclosed defamatory facts, but also whether financial message
boards and chat rooms constitute a forum in which the audience expects to
find truthful and verifiable discourse.
2.

Language of Hyberbole and Opinion

Although the majority of corporate cybersmear cases 'have been settled,
dismissed, or remain in the early stages of litigation," a prevalent defense
appears to have emerged: "that speech on the Internet is, by its nature,
language of hyperbole and opinion and thus not actionable under traditional
principles of libel law.",2 19 Moreover, online communication tends to be
"colloquial in tone, opinionated, speculative, and frequently caustic and
derogatory," and "anyone who frequents the message boards interprets what
Betts Corp., defendants argued that "casual statements about a company on a Yahoo! message board
express opinions, rather than facts" analogous to "stock tips in financial publications, or commentary
in financial newsletters." Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Special Mot. to Strike, Thomas & Betts Corp.
v. Does I through 50, No. GIC 748128 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000), available at
http://www.citizen.org/litigation/briefs/sandiego.htm (last visited July 12, 2000).
214. Agora, Inc. v. Axxess, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702 (D. Md. 2000) (quoting Peroutka v.
Streng, 695 A.2d 1287, 1293 (Md. Ct. App. 1997)). In Agora, the court held that an online statement
accusing a company of relying on "pseudo research" was not defamatory "because it constitute[d] an
expression of opinion based on disclosed or readily available facts." Id. at 703.
215. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
216. Smith, supra note 6, at 8.
217. Id. Illustrating this argument, some courts have held that discussions that may constitute
libel in one context might not considered libelous when posted on an Internet bulletin board. See,
e.g., Nicosia v. De Rooy, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1999). In Nicosia, the defendant posted
statements on a bulletin board alleging that the plaintiff was a murderer and guilty of perjury, fraud,
and a laundry list of other offenses. Id. at 1102-07. The court held that these statements were
nothing more than mere opinion which frequently occurs "in the context of controversial debate on
the Internet" and therefore, "readers are more likely to understand ... as figurative, hyperbolic
expressions." Id.
218. See id. Clearly, a rational argument can be made that the opinion privilege should be
extended to Internet users "who post on Internet message boards, despite the fact that those posters
may be more apt to publish inaccurate information .... " Lidsky, supra note 23, at 946 n.332. This
article, however, advocates that because victims of corporate cybersmear must cope with the
consequences of the defamatory speech, the perpetrators of such reckless falsehoods should be held
equally accountable.
219. Smith, supra note 6, at 7. "[C]ommon law tradition has combined with constitutional
principles to clothe the use of epithets, insults, name-calling, and hyperbole with virtually
impenetrable legal armor." Id. (quoting JAMES J. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND OTHER RELATED
PROBLEMS § 2.4.7 (3d ed. 2000)).
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is posted accordingly., 2 1 In addition, given the prevalence of "flaming '22'
and other forms of "netiquette,. 222 several scholars have argued that the
Internet audience has essentially become immune to the various forms of
exaggerated and, at times, ridiculous discourse occurring in cyberspace. 3
Despite the impact that these defamatory statements frequently have,2 4
Yahoo! financial message boards, for example, routinely caution that:
"These messages are only the opinion of the poster, are no substitute for
your own research, and should not be relied upon for trading or any other
purpose." '25 Courts have held that similar disclaimers deny a defamation
cause of action based on a detrimental financial rating.2 6 Thus, at least
where the framing of the statement permits the presumption, casual
statements posted on the Internet regarding a company should generally be
construed as opinions, rather than facts, for the same reason that courts have
been reluctant to treat negative "stock tips" in financial newsletters as
actionable defamatory statements. 7

220. Id. at 8. (citing Compl., Doe v. Yahoo! (N.D. Cal. 2000), available at
http://www.epic.org/anonymity/aquacool.-complaint.pdf. (last visited Feb. 19, 2002)). Supporting
the possible merits of this defense, commentators have argued that in many cases, the level of
discourse occurring in chat rooms and online message "boards bears more resemblance to informal
gossip than to rational deliberation, and the culture of the boards fosters. . . 'disinformation, rumors,
and garbage."' Lidsky, supra note 23, at 893 (quoting Reliable Sources: Are 24-Hour TV and the
Internet Helping People Understand Wall Street, or is There Too Much Bull in the Bull Market?
(CNN television broadcast, July 31, 1999), transcript available in LEXIS, Transcripts File)).
221. See Ian C. Ballon, E-Commerce and Internet Law: A Primer,in Fourth Annual Internet Law
Institute, Vol. One 9, 20 (2000) (defining "flaming" as the practice of sending strident or offensive
email messages).
222. Internet etiquette, or "netiquette," generally refers to "the informal rules and customs that
have developed on the Internet...." Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
223. Lidsky, supra note 23, at 919 (arguing that, in large part, the online audience views Inte.rnet
discourse as mere "rhetorical hyperbole or subjective speculation rather than a sober recitation of
actual facts.").
224. "'With the rise of day trading and momentum trading, people don't take the time to do due
diligence. Some people probably actually believe what they read. Others are just hoping to catch a
wave.'
Walsh, supra note 59 (quoting Christine Chung, who oversees the SEC's Internet
Investigations division in Boston).
225. See Hritz v. Doe, supra note 46.
226. See Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Moody's Investor's Servs., 988 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (D.
Colo. 1997).
227. See Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that an
observation that a company's stock price was based on "hype and hope" was merely a statement of
opinion); see also Morginstar, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (Ct. App. 1994).

567

a.

Global Telemedia International,Inc. v. Does 1 through 35

In Global Telemedia International,Inc. v. Does 1 through 35,28 Judge
David 0. Carter of the United States District Court for the Central District of
California observed that in order

[t]o determine whether a statement is an opinion or fact, the Court
must look at the totality of the circumstances. This entails
examining the statement in its "broad context, which includes the
general tenor of the entire work, the subject of the statement, the
setting, and the format of the work." '29
In a ruling that free-speech advocates have heralded as a "significant
victory," the district court in Global Telemedia reasoned that the "message
board was a forum for the exchange of opinions.2 30
Similar to most victims of online corporate defamation, the plaintiff,
Global Telemedia International ("GTMI") was a publicly company and
alleged that a long campaign of cybersmear had caused its stock to
plummet." ' In addition to other allegedly defamatory statements, defendants
posted the following messages on the company's message board:

228. Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Does I through 35, No. SA CV OD-I 155(C.D. Cal. Feb. 23,
2001) (order granting defendant's special motion to strike).
229. Id. at 20 (citing Nicosia v. De Rooy, 72 F. Supp.2d 1093, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (applying
the fact/opinion distinction where libelous statements were posted on the Internet)). Describing the
general tenor of the discourse at issue in Global Telenmedia, which is similar to the typical
cybersmear case, Judge Carter observed:
Unlike many traditional media, there are no controls on the postings. Literally anyone
who has access to the Internet has access to the chat-rooms ....No special expertise,
knowledge or status is required to post a message, or to respond ....The vast majority of
the users are, because of the "handles," effectively anonymous. The messages range
from relatively straightforward commentary to personal invective directed at other
posters and at the subject company to the simply bizarre. For example, one exchange
includes "joemeat, you are one of the stupidest suckers that ever posted here" to which
"joemeat" responded "akita: that means so much coming from a degenerate who speaks
regularly from his lower orifice."
Id. at 5 (quoting Gray Decl., Ex. G.).
230. Cassell Bryan-Low, E*Trade Sues Over Postings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2001, at CI,
available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2855560.
231. Global Telemedia Int'l v. Does I through 35, No. SA CV 00-1155 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2001)
(order granting defendant's special motion to strike), at 2 (noting that GTMI "is a publicly traded
telecommunications company trading on the [NASD] OTC Bulletin Board."). GTMI began trading
publicly in June 1999. See id. at 3. "It has traded from around $.80 a share in June of 1999 to a
high of around $4.70 a share in March of 2000 to a low of [$J.25 [per] share in October 2000." Id.
(citing Opp'n to King Mot. at 9). GTMI's stock "has closed at below $1.00 a share since April of
2000." Id. (citing Stevens Decl. in Opp'n to King Mot., Ex. B-I)).
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1. "Sinking Ship"
"[a]nother day with GTMI steering the sinking ship, but don't worry
they are headed for the calmer waters of the carribean where your money
will be safe from federal authorities,, now thats newz . .,232
2. "Fly the Coop"
"[t]rust your stomach, that feeling that says we are beeing
manipulated by the company so that they can fly the coop
again, who oh why must we keep saying I hear they are,
they said they were, WERE IS THE PR TO THE LONGS
SAYING SORRY FOOLS WE WENT BELLY UP
SORRY FOR SPOING YOUR WEEKEND, SORRY FOR
NOT MEETING OUR TARGET DATES AND OH YEA
SORRY WE MISSED THE BOAT IN GETTING OUR
PRODUCT OUT." '33
3. "Screwed out of your money"
"sell tomorrow take your dollars, write off the loss.., you have been

of your hard earned money here its time to talk about a
screwed out
34
lawsuit.,1

4. "Blatant mis-management.., they lie"
"I have never witnessed such blatant mis-management, these people
hold our money and they dictate after they lie how it will be
used .... greatest joke on the boards."235

232. Id. at 31 (quoting Stevens Decl. In Opp'n to King Mem. Ex. A at 39). The district court
concluded that "in the context of the full message," [these] "comments are hyperbolic and
figurative." Id. at 32. Moreover, "[tlhe posting [was] also in response to another posting, making
it less likely to be a statement of fact. Given the tone and context of the message, a reasonable reader
would not take this to be anything more than a disappointed investor who is making sarcastic cracks
about the company." Id.
233. Id. at 33 (quoting Stevens Decl. in Opp'n to King Mem. Ex. A at 37). "Plaintiffs argue[d]
that 'fly the coop again' is stating a fact that 'GTMI not only intends to steal investor money, but
that such theft is or will be merely a repeat of a previous GTMI theft. This is not opinion, but an
Id. at 34 (quoting Opp'n to King Mot. at 8). "First,
I..."
outright accusation of criminal intention .
the [clourt note[d] that 'fly the coop' is a colloquial expression meaning 'to depart suddenly or
surreptitiously, escape, flee."' Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD INT'L DICT. (1986)). "Second, 'fly
the coop' is part of a rambling sentence full of figurative and expressive language ('trust your
stomach,' 'why oh why') and sarcasm." Id. (determining that "[g]iven the context and content, no
reasonable reader would believe that [the poster] was stating a fact that the company was going to
flee or escape."). According to Judge Carter, "[t]he posting [was] written with a great deal of
linguistic informality, thus alerting a reasonable reader that these observations are probably not
written by someone with authority or firm factual foundations for his beliefs." Id.
234. Id. at 1 36. "Plaintiffs argue[d] that '[the poster] appear[ed] to be soliciting a shareholder
lawsuit against GTMI."' Id. at 37 (disagreeing with this interpretation and noting that "even if that
is the import of the message, then it is simply the opinion of a shareholder who believes a lawsuit
may be his only recourse against a company.").
235. Plaintiffs interpreted this statement as, "in essence, that GTMI misrepresents its business

5. "Busted ... Let the truth be told"

"SEC link[.] To view Jonathon Bentley Stevens [GTMI's CEO's]
violations:http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lrI 5774.txt[.] He was busted
for misrepresentation and overstatement of the facts: Let the truth be
told .... ,236
According to the district court "the general tenor, the setting and the
format of... [the defendant's] statements strongly suggest[ed] that the
postings [were] opinion. 237 Judge Carter, in holding that all of the allegedly
defamatory statements were non-actionable statements of opinion,
emphasized the fact that "[t]he statements were posted anonymously in the
general cacophony of an Internet chat-room ....
Moreover, "[tlhe
postings at issue were anonymous as are all other postings in the chat-room"

and "were part of an on-going, free-wheeling and highly animated exchange
about GTMI and its turbulent history. 239 The district court in Global
Telemedia insinuated that in order to constitute actionable statements of fact,
the postings must possess "formality and polish typically found in
documents in which a reader would expect to find facts."" ° Although the

intentions, apparently as part of its standard practice to say anything to raise investor funds." Id. at 1
38 (quoting Opp'n to King Mot. at 8). The district court, however, disagreed, and observed that
"while [the] sentiments [were] not positive, the statements contain[ed] exaggerated speech and broad
generalities, all indicia of opinion." Id. at 1 38 (concluding that "[g]iven the tone, a reasonable
reader would not think the poster was stating facts about the company, but rather expressing
displeasure with the way the company [was] run.").
236. Id. at 1 29. Amazingly, the court held that even this statement was not defamatory. Instead,
Judge Carter reasoned that the statement was "clearly based on a public document which he provides
for the readers." Id. "Thus, any reader [could] look at the same document and determine what they
think from the information." Id. According to Judge Carter, "[b]y supplying the underlying
document which supports his views, [the poster] ha[d] set forth an opinion, not fact." Id. (citing
Nicossia, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1102). Moreover, the court carefully distinguished being "busted" from
being "arrested." Id. at 30 (noting that "[w]hile the average investor may interpret 'busted' as
'caught' or 'found out,' that reader is highly unlikely to believe that the SEC has arrested anyone for
'misrepresentation' or 'overstatement."'). In many cases, however, the mere fact that the SEC is
investigating a company will create sufficient panic amongst investors, thus a drop in a stock's
value. Perhaps the court had an alternative rationale for concluding that this particular allegation
was not a statement of fact, because even if it was, it appears that the statement was true. See id.
(citing Gray Decl., Exs. A, B, C) (noting that while the poster was "simply stating his opinion that
the SEC is investigating Bentley Stevens, which in point of fact it is.").
237. Id. at$ 21.
238. Id.
239. Id. Although the district court's reasoning is questionable, it provides, nevertheless, a solid
framework for Doe defendant's to escape liability for their defamatory statements by relying on the
argument that "the postings are full of hyperbole, invective, short-hand phrases and language not
generally found in fact-based documents, such as corporate press releases or SEC filings." Id. at
22.
240. Id. at
25, 26 (deciding that the web posting merely constituted statements of opinion
because, "[i]n short, the general tone and context of these messages strongly suggest that they are the
opinions of the posters. In addition, the content and style of the individual postings support a finding
that they are the opinions of the posters.").
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ultimate impact of the Global Telemedia holding remains unclear, for the
time being, the case marks a definitive victory for Doe defendants. 4
3.

Qualified Privilege For Communication Amongst Interested Parties

Another potential defense to a defamation claim brought against a
anonymous cybersmearer could be qualified privilege for communications
among "interested parties. ,,2
Although the California Supreme Court, in
Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting,43 held that the qualified privilege for
communication among interested parties does not apply to mass media
communications, the privilege does apply to communications that are
published amongst a narrow group that share a common interest. 4' It
appears that defendants, in corporate cybersmear cases, could make a strong
argument that the privilege should apply because financial message boards
and chat rooms are dedicated to discussion of particular corporations, and
thus appeal to a narrow audience who share a common interest.2

241. See id. at 14 (pronouncing that this holding does not "necessarily foreclose defamation
cases against individuals, as not all business will be found to be a 'public issue.' Further, even
where a business is found to be of public concern, where there is a probability of success, the claim
may proceed."). The Global Telemedia analysis is ripe for criticism. While largely basing his
conclusion that remarkably all the statements at issue were opinions and claiming to adopt a
reasonableness standard, Judge Carter, like most courts, did "not conduct empirical research as to the
hypothetical conduct of the average person in similar circumstances despite the fact that the practice
of mankind generally... carries significant weight in determining reasonableness." Daniel More,
Informers Defamation and Public Policy, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 503, 534 n.33 (citing Allen
M. Linden, Custom in Negligence, II CAN. B. J. 151, 169 (1968)). Had the court embarked upon
such an analysis, it would have realized that even "reasonable" investors are often significantly
swayed, in their investment decisions, by defamatory cybersmear. See Toross, supra note I, at 1403
(recognizing that "[a] stock's price can be influenced within minutes of posting information on" an
Internet chat-room or bulletin board). The Global Telemedia decision clearly marks the first time
that "a court has held that Internet message boards devoted to discussions about a publicly traded
company 'are indeed connected with a public issue and fully protected under anti-SLAPP
provisions."' Joyzelle Davis, Judge Says Investor Web Chat Is Not Libel Litigation, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2001, at C4, available at 2001 WL 245336 (quoting Megan Gray, an attorney with Baker &
Hostetler and leading cybersmear litigator). The ruling, however, might not create clear precedent
for other courts to follow. See id. (quoting UCLA law professor and First Amendment scholar
Eugene Volokh).
242. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 47(c) (2000). Qualified communication among interested parties
is a common law privilege afforded to persons who publish a statement on a matter of common
interest as long as the statement is made in good faith. See id.
243. 48 Cal. 3d 711 (1989).
244. See Emde v. San Joaquin County Central Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146 (1943) (extending
the privilege to immunize liability for a defamatory statement published in a labor union newsletter).
245. See id. However, if the defendant were to attempt to invoke the qualified privilege for
communication among interested parties, it would logically follow that he would simultaneously
have to negate any possible argument that the statement involved a matter of public concern.

4. SLAPPed With Yet Another Procedural Pitfall On the Road to
Recovery
"Corporations have begun to use defamation suits as an offensive
tactic."246 Several states have enacted "anti-SLAPP" (Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation) statutes 7 as a prophylactic deterrent designed
to limit frivolous defamation claims."4 For example, in 1992 the California
legislature enacted an anti-SLAPP statute 49 "which provided broad authority
to strike a complaint based on an act of free speech 'in connection with a
pubic issue' unless the court determined the plaintiff had established, by
credible evidence, 'a probability [that it would] prevail on the claim."'2 ""
Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case illustrating that the basis
of the claims against him arise out of acts in furtherance of speech that is in
connection with a public issue, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate a probability of success on the merits. 5 Although anti-SLAPP
246. Jackson, supra note 112, at 492.
247. Thirteen states have enacted ant-SLAPP statutes, including California, Colorado, Delaware,
Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, and Tennessee. See Gail Diane Cox, Pushing the SLAPP Envelope, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 19,
1999, at Al (noting that ten additional states are currently considering whether to enact anti-SLAPP
legislation).
248. Smith, supra note 6, at 8 (arguing that "it is not clear that these laws will adequately protect
individuals accused of attacking corporate targets."). "Between 1972 and 1992, 'thousands of
SLAPPS were filed, tens of thousands of Americans were SLAPPed, and still more were muted or
silenced by the threat."' Dennis J. Seider, SLAPP Shot, 23-NOV L.A. LAW. 32, 33-34 (2000).
249. CAL. Clv. CODE § 425.16. "The suits are an attempt to 'privatize' public debate: a unilateral
initiative by one side to transform a public, political dispute into a private, legislative adjudication,
shifting both forum and issues to disadvantage the opposition." GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE
CANAN, STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, 35 SOC. PROB. 506 (1988); see
also Seider, supra note 248, at 32 (noting that anti-SLAPP statutes were largely enacted because, in
many cases, "[tihe object of a plaintiff's lawsuit was often not to prevail at trial but to quell criticism
by instilling a fear in its targets of large recoveries and legal costs" and "[c]ommercial plaintiffs well positioned to absorb significant legal costs - posed an especially serious threat to small groups
or lone critics sued for speaking against certain practices of the commercial plaintiffs.").
250. Id. at 34 (quoting CAL. CIv. CODE § 425.16 added by 1192 CAL. STAT. c. 726 (S.B. 1264), §
2; amended by 1993 CAL. STAT. c. 271). California's anti-SLAPP statute provides in relevant part:
(e) As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public
issue" includes:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law; (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right
of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.
Id. (noting that "[s]ection 425.16(e) subdivisions I and 2 are sometimes referred to as the
'petitioning' or 'official proceeding' privilege," while "[s]ubdivisions 3 and 4 refer to what is often
called the 'public interest' or 'public issue' privilege.").
251. Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1129 (N.D. Cal.
1999). In Zhao v. Wong, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114 (1996) the court held that "sensation" or "media
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statutes are primarily designed to apply in situations concerning
governmental action, courts have interpreted the provision to apply to even
where the speech "involves purely private commercial endeavors." 2
Commonly, "[t]hese suits are aimed not at rectifying truly defamatory
statements made by defendants, but rather, at intimidating them from
voicing their public concerns.""5 "Moreover, corporations use SLAPPs to
discourage involvement not only by the named defendants, but also by their
neighbors and the remaining community."" ' Generally, the effectiveness of
SLAPP suits can be attributed to the disparity of resources between a
corporate plaintiff and an individual defendant. 5
As applied to cybersmear cases, in order to get the corporate plaintiff's
complaint SLAPPed out of court the defendant has a heavy burden of
proving that the posted messages "'could be characterized as statements
made in [a] place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an
issue of public interest."'2 56 Moreover, "[i]f absolute privilege does not

attention" does not create an issue of public interest. Zhao, however, has been criticized by the
California Supreme Court for its interpretation of the SLAPP provision. See Briggs v. Eden Council
for Hope and Opportunity, 19 Cal. App. 4th 1106 (1999) (disapproving of Zhao's reading of "public
interest" as too narrow and observing that the Legislature's 1997 amendment to the SLAPP statute
indicates that the section "shall be construed broadly.").
252. Seider, supra note 248, at 34. "The public interest privileges of Code of Civil Procedure
Section 425.16(e) are broadly construed to include what would otherwise be considered private
commercial conduct." Id. at 35 (arguing that "[c]ommercial speech, like all advocacy, has at its
heart the advancement of self-interest and the defeat of another's, but if the speech involves a
commercial product that is subject to regulation or touches upon important social issues," the antiSLAPP statute "should apply."). Thus, it appears that anti-SLAPP statutes should apply in many
cybersmear cases because frequently the statements, albeit false ones, pertain to matters that are
subject to regulation by the SEC and relate to matters that are generally in the public interest. See
Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 632 (1996) (stating that "[allthough
matters of public interest include legislative and governmental activities, they may also include
activities that involve private persons and entities, especially when a large, powerful organization
may impact the lives of many individuals.").
253. Jackson, supra note 112, at 493 (citing Sharlene A. McEvoy, "The Big Chill": Business
Useof the Tort of Defamation to Discourage the Exercise of First Amendment Rights, 17 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 503, 504 (1990)).
254. Id. (citing Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse of Libel
Law for Political Purposesand a Countersuit Response, 7 J. L. & POL. 417,466-70 (1991)).
255. Id. "As one defense lawyer stated, '[flew average citizens have the wherewithall [sic] to
defend themselves against the armoire of monies expended by ... corporations who-not only may
have the means to mount suits, but can claim further tax advantages for the legal expenses
involved."' Id. at 493-94 (quoting RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, NO CONTEST 163 (1996))).
256. Seider, supra note 248, at 52 (quoting Globetrotter Software v. Elan Computer Group, 63 F.
Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1999). In order to avoid the potential that their complaints could be
SLAPPed out of court, there may be an incentive for corporate plaintiffs to file cybersmear suits in
federal court and avoid the application of the anti-SLAPP statute altogether. See United States v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1203

protect the defendant, an argument for needed discovery into the existence
of malice may be the best way to delay or defeat a SLAPP defendant's
motion to strike." 7 For example, in ComputerXpress.com, Inc., a California
court recently denied a cybersmear defendant's motion to strike a corporate
plaintiffs complaint pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute on the
grounds that the lawsuit fell outside the scope of the statute. "

Thus,

although the anti-SLAPP statute poses an immediate procedural obstacle for
corporate plaintiffs seeking to pursue a defamation claim for alleged
cybersmear, in most cases it is unlikely to render summary dismissal."9
VI. How

CORPORATIONS CAN MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE INFLICTED BY
INTERNET DEFAMATION

Even in its infancy, the majority of scholarly attention concerning
corporate cybersmear has focused on protecting the rights of John Doe,
while the rights of smeared corporations to restore their reputations appear to
have been forgotten somewhere along the way." As a practical matter,
corporations face a number of both legal and financial decisions in
determining how to combat a ruthless cybersmear campaign. Blake A. Bell,
an attorney at New York's Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett, and an expert in
corporate cybersmear cases, suggests that "[s]eeking a judicial remedy may
satisfy primal urges to seek vengeance, but is likely to be a costly and,
perhaps, futile option."2 ' Rather, Bell recommends implementing a series of

(2000) (noting that the anti-SLAPP statute under Erie "was plainly procedural, its objective was
manifestly substantive."); see also Rogers v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973, 977
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (concluding "that [section] 425.16 does not substantively alter any cause of action
[but is] [i]nstead.. . 'a mere rule of procedure ....')(quoting Ludwig v. Sup. Ct. 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d
350, 360 (1995)).
257. Seider, supra note 248, at 54.
258. See Smith, supra note 6, at 8 (citing Def.'s Mot. to Strike Cybersmear Compl.as Improper
SLAPP Denied by Court, 2 CYBERSECURITIESLAW TRIB.,
available at http://
www.cybersecuritieslaw.com (last visited August 21, 2000).
259. In addition to making a strong argument that the cybersmear falls outside the scope of the
anti-SLAPP statute, corporate plaintiffs can defeat a defendant's motion to strike the complaint
simply by arguing for necessary additional discovery. See Seider, supra note 248, at 54.
260. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 914 (emphasizing the potential contributions of John Doe's
anonymous speech while neglecting the detrimental consequences that cybersmear in fact creates);
Sobel, supra note 14, at 3 (sympathizing with John Doe while failing to acknowledge the damage
frequently inflicted upon corporations victimized by ruthless falsehoods); Tien, supra note 38, at 144
(focusing on the "serious costs" of compelled revelation of an anonymous speaker's identity without
recognition of the "serious costs" incurred by shareholders and corporations as a direct result of their
speech). But see Branscomb, supra note 25, at 1675-76 (arguing that anonymity should not serve as
a shield to protect abusive online speakers).
261. Bell, supra note 8 (observing that "[a]nyone - including short sellers, fired employees,
disgruntled employees and irrate customers - can easily walk into a cyber-cafd, plunk down cash to
gain Internet access for a few minutes and make false and disparaging postings through services like
www.anonymizer.com. Such posting are difficult, if not impossible, to trace.").
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institutional safeguards and preemptive measures in attempting to combat
the smear.2 62
A.

ProphylacticMeasures to Stop the Spread of Smear

To have a legitimate chance of minimizing the effects of cybersmear,
companies "must be cyber-savvy and well-informed to avoid being caught
off guard. 263

In certain circumstances, it may be beneficial to monitor

online discourse concerning the company.M Further, companies must take
necessary precautions to ensure that their employees are not involved, either

intentionally or unwittingly, in sparking "Intemet rumors that can mushroom
into public relations nightmares. 265
The case of CIBER Inc. illustrates how problems "can arise in the
absence of clear employee guidelines" defining appropriate corporate
After failing to follow message board
discourse on the Internet.2"

"discussions" until its stock price declined for no apparent reason, CIBER
Inc. "issued a press release stating that it was unaware of any companyspecific reason for the price decline." '67 Subsequently, CIBER Inc.'s
"director of investor relations began to monitor message boards related to

the company" and discovered that individuals identifying themselves as
CIBER Inc. "employees were discussing the company on the message
boards., 26' Analogous to CIBER Inc., Raytheon, after filing suit against
twenty-one "Doe" defendants who posted embarrassing messages about the

262. Id. It appears that if corporations implement prudent courses of action to protect themselves
from cyber-gossip, they might not have to worry about the problem later on down the road. See id.
(noting that "[tihe increasing frequency of corporate cyber-smears strongly suggests that companies
should anticipate the worst and put into place corporate policies and damage control mechanisms
designed to deal with a cyber-smear as soon as it is discovered.").
263. Id. (recommending that companies "[a]ssign personnel to monitor pertinent Internet chat
rooms, message boards, Usenet newsgroups, Web pages and other Internet sites where the company
is likely to be mentioned."). It is possible, however, "that once a company begins monitoring the
Internet for rumors, it assumes a duty to correct false rumors of which it learns if it has no valid
corporate purpose for leaving the rumor uncorrected." Id. (citing ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5C
LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5 § 88.04[b], at 4-23 through 4-24 (1996)).
(noting that there are many widely-used monitoring services including: Ewatch., Inc.,
264. See id.
Burson-Marsteller, and The Delahaye Group).
265. Id. (providing that employees should be given "clear guidelines that proscribe discussions of
internal corporate matters, company business, client information and confidential business data via
the Internet.").
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. After discovering that employees were using the boards to discuss internal corporate
matters, CIBER Inc. decided to revise its Internet policy in the next edition of the company's
employee handbook. Id. (citing Companies Battle Libel on the Web: Chat Rooms Pose Legal
Challenges, DEN. BUS. J., Oct. 9, 1998).

company, including allegations of product testing failures, learned that one
of the posters, "RSCDeepThroat," was actually one of the company's vicepresidents.269
B.

Silence Might Not be Golden

Contrary to the popular corporate belief "that silence or a simple 'no
comment' is an appropriate response to any kind of rumor, this approach can
27
be risky when cyber-gossip is involved.""

Rather, as Blake A. Bell

explains:
Ordinarily a company has no duty under the securities laws to

correct or to verify rumors unless those rumors can in some way be
attributed to the company. If, however, the company has placed a
hyperlink on its own Web site linking to a message board, chat
room or newsgroup devoted to the company and its securities, and
the rumor appears on the linked site, an argument could be made

that the company has entangled itself with the rumor and, thus, may
have a duty to respond.27"'

Moreover, companies have a duty to act prudently and to protect their
'
shareholder's interest, thus "mere inaction is rarely a viable alternative."272
C. Should Companies Slug It Out With Their Libelous Cyber-Critics?

Frequently, public relations firms and marketing experts have urged
their corporate clients to respond to cybersmear "before it spirals out of
'
control."273
"Internet-savvy securities lawyers, however, generally advise

269. Id. (noting that "RSCDeepThroat" has since resigned).
270. Id. (recognizing, however, "that there can be circumstances in which a company risks
potential liability under the securities laws if it simply ignores Internet rumors."); see also Jeffrey B.
Rudman, et al., D&O Liability in Cyberspace: Taking Advantage of Technology Without Tripping
Over the FederalSecurities Laws, 15 No. 18 ANDREWS CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG.
REPORTER 16, July 17, 2000, Part III (recommending that "[glenerally, it is not advisable to respond
to rumors about the company ....While a management's instinct may be to respond, especially
when the rumor is patently offensive in nature (as many message board posts are), turning the other
cheek is usually the best course of action.").
271. Bell, supra note 8. In addition, self-regulatory rules similar to "those promulgated by the
New York Stock Exchange, AMEX and NASDAQ may impose an independent duty on listed
companies to respond to Internet rumors." Id. "For example, section 202.03 of the New York Stock
Exchange Listed Company Manual requires listed companies, in certain circumstances, promptly to
deny or clarify rumors without regard to the source of such rumors." Id.; see also Rudman et al.,
supra note 296 (noting that "[t]he New York Stock Exchange Manual § 202.03, for example,
requires that a company should be prepared to make an announcement if unusual market activity
occurs prior to its announcement.").
272. Bell, supra note 8 (questioning the possibility that either the rumors may, in fact, be true or
whether an investigation may be warranted).
273. Id. (noting that public relations and marketing firm often recommend that companies "go so
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against using the Internet" when responding to cybersmear.2

1'

In many

instances, the "potential for liability escalates if... the [company] has
followed the advice of some public relations experts and responded directly
to newsgroups where unfavorable rumors were flying." ' Likewise, John R.
Hewitt, an attorney in the New York office of Chicago's Mayer, Brown &
Platt suggests that the last thing that the company should do is attempt to
"slug it out" with a cybersmearer.27 6 Hewitt cautions, however, that a
company which is publicly traded may have a duty to respond by issuing a
press release and a statement through a corporate website if the stock price is
affected.277

D. Swinging the Litigation Club to Silence John Doe Could Backfire

1. The "McLibel" case: Why Suing an Anonymous Critic Might Not
Make Cents
"For many companies, the most expensive, time-consuming and leastpalatable option is to commence litigation against the perpetrators of
27
disparaging Internet rumors.""
The infamous McDonald's "McLibel" case

far as to participate in Usenet newsgroups, message boards and chat rooms to add the company's
view to the overall mix of information.").
274. Id. (recognizing that "[t]here are unique liability risks associated with using the Internet to
reply to rumors."); see also Rudman et al., supra note 270 (observing that "[bly responding to a
rumor, a company may assume a 'duty to update' or a 'duty to correct' the information in the
response that it would not otherwise have.").
275. Prentice, supra note 189, at 76 (emphasis in original omitted) (arguing that where companies
undertake to correct false and detrimental rumors posted on Internet message boards, "[t]he failure to
then similarly correct beneficial rumors gives rise to very plausible claims of selective disclosure.").
Id. "Even accurate disclosures could be viewed as illicitly 'selective' and," if acted upon, could
"invite insider trading liability .
I..."
Id. at 77.
276. Ellen L. Rosen, Savvy Investors Seek Out SEC to Stop Internet Fraud,NAT'L L. J., Feb. 14,
2000, at B5.
277. Id.; see also Bell, supra note 8 (noting that "there may come a time when a company
concludes that response to cyber-gossip is necessary ....In such circumstances, some companies
have chosen to permit their investor relations personnel or other employees to discuss appropriate
company matters in chat rooms and on message boards.").
278. Bell, supra note 8 (observing that "[clyber-libel lawsuits are not necessarily the answer"
because "[a]lthough many such lawsuits have been commenced, neither there success nor their
deterrent value has yet been proven."). Alternatively, for companies that wish to go to court,
"[flighting is relatively easy." Robert McGawey, Cyberslander. (Industry Trend or Event),
ELECTRONIC Bus. TODAY, Mar. 1, 2001, at 39, available at 2001 WL 8165486 (quoting Dawn
Estes, an attorney for the Dallas law firm of Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP). According to
experienced litigators, the key is to "[a]ct quickly." Id. (quoting Andy Serwin, lawyer at Baker &
McKenzie in San Diego). First, the faster the "bad news is extinguished, the less likely destructive
rumors will swirl around the business. And second, different message boards and ...ISPs hold onto

illustrates how corporations might only be hurting themselves by
brandishing the litigation club to silence a libelous critic.279 Describing the
McLibel case, one commentator observed:
McDonald's filed a libel action in England over statements made in

a pamphlet (that might [a]s well have been placed on a Web site by
more sophisticated defendants). McDonalds won the suit but in so
doing spent $16 million in order to obtain an uncollectible $68,000
judgment. The trial was the longest in English legal history and was
a public relations disaster for the company. McDonald's would
have done well [better] to just have looked the other way.28
Litigation provides no guarantee that the cybersmearers can actually be
identified or deterred, regardless of how much time, money, and effort are
spent."8' Moreover, even if the matter can be prosecuted to a final judgment,
there is2 a strong likelihood that the individual defendant may be judgmentproof."
Therefore, because companies cannot truly stop the smear,

access logs for varying lengths of time, but all destroy old records eventually." Id. (quoting Serwin
as stating: "'You want to act while you can still lay your hands on the records."').
279. See McGawey, supra note 278. Although "most lawyers view winning these actions as a
slamdunk - mainly because there is a massive mismatch between the resources of an established
business and those of a malcontented poster ...not all lawyers counsel moving ahead with suits."
Id. (quoting Bob Vieth, a lawyer with Cooley Godward LLP in Reston, Va., as stating: ."I
commonly advise conservatism here ...[if a company chooses to] file [alawsuit] ... this news will
wind up in many newspapers."'). "And, in reporting those stories, newspapers will frequently repeat
the content of the original, harmful postings. Suddenly, the readership of the false information has
multiplied 'and you have to ask if getting this defamatory content republished in newspapers is in
your interest."' Id. (quoting Vieth and noting that as a final motivating factor, according to Vieth,
"'[it's very, very easy for a company to seem like a bully in these actions."').
280. Prentice, supra note 189, at 73. In some cases, however, looking the other way may not be a
realistic option. For example, the defamatory posting on a Yahoo! financial news bulletin board
stated that Skechers USA, Inc. was probably going to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.
McGawey, supra note 278, at 39 (noting that "[tihe poster of the information insisted he knew this to
be true because he had heard it directly from the CEO of the Manhattan Beach, CA-based
manufacturer of trendy thick-soled shoes and boots."). Further, in another message, posted only
forty-five minutes after the original defamatory message, designed to appear as though it was posted
by Skecher's CEO, confirmed the bankruptcy allegation. See id. (noting that "there were two
problems: Skecher's CEO, Robert Greenberg, never made the posting that supposedly came from
him, and the shoemaker wasn't mulling over bankruptcy."). Because the allegations were blatantly
false, Skecher's decided to file a libel claim against the defamatory posters. Id. (quoting Chris
Reede, an attorney with the Los Angeles office of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hayes & Handler LLP,
the firm that represents Skecher's, as stating: "'We determined we had to take action."').
281. Bell, supra note 8.
282. Id.; see also Branscomb, supra note 25, at 1645 n. 16 (1995) (noting that many perpetrators of
false and disparaging messages may be "young users just learning their computer skills, who have
little or no financial capability to pay damages imposed by a legal judgment."). Although Internet
users posting messages on financial message board might arguably be more sophisticated than the
average Internet user, their ability to satisfy a judgment, nevertheless, remains unclear and, in many
cases, unlikely.
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preventative
measures designed to curtail the inevitable appear to be the best
23
policy.
2.

Beware of the Counterclaim: Do You Really Want an SEC
Investigation?

"Holding true to the old saw that 'the best defense is a good offense,'
substantive counterclaims have" become a favorite weapon of cybersmear
defendants. ' The most notable and widely reported case of a defendant
asserting a counterclaim against a smeared corporate plaintiff "involves a
cybersmear suit filed by ITEX Corp. in August 1998.,,28" Beginning in July
of 1998, a series of cybersmears were posted on a Yahoo! Finance message
board that was devoted to discussion of ITEX stock. 86 Using the aliases
"colojopa," "Investor 727," and "Orangemuscat," online critics engaged in a
relentless smear campaign against the corporation. 7
Subsequently, ITEX filed a complaint alleging that the posters "had
engaged in unlawful trade practices, civil conspiracy and defamation. 288 On
August 26, 1998, one of the defendants, Leslie L. French, retaliated and filed
an answer providing an affirmative defense, asserted a counterclaim, and

283. Bell, supra note 8. As an alternative to litigation, some companies have sought the assistance
of private investigative firms who specialize in obtaining the identities of anonymous Internet
message posters. See Rudman et al., supra note 270 (noting that "private investigators use
procedures such as 'data mining' to survey the Internet."). For example, the Internet Crimes Group
("ICG"), a Princeton, New Jersey private investigation firm, helps corporations "smoke out angry
ex-employees or stock-fraud suspects." Id. (noting that approximately "one-third of ICG's business
involves tracking down anonymous online" critics). Illustrating the uncanny ability of ICG to track
down a unruly, in one instance:
An Irvine, California software-leasing company hired ICG to unmask someone calling
himself "ZeroBid" who had posted Message Board accusations that the company could
be fraudulently promoting its stock through a pump and dump scheme. ICG staffers
noticed that ZeroBid left a message on the Raging Bull stock discussion Web site saying
"This board is dead. I'm going over to play chess on Yahoo!" They tracked ZeroBid
down at the chess site and, using assumed names, challenged him to matches for several
weeks. ICG matched the nickname to a list of the firm's employees. The company
passed on ZeroBid's posting to securities regulators. The matter is pending.
Id.
284. Blake A. Bell, Plaintiff Corporations Face Reprisals From Cybersmear Defendants, THE
CORPORATE
COUNSELLOR,
Newsletter,
January
2000,
available
at
http://www.ljx.comlnewsletters/private/corpcounsellor/2000/2000_01_01.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2001).
285. Id. ITEX is a Nevada corporation that is based in Oregon and operates the ITEX Retail
Trade Exchange. Id.
286. Id.
287. See id. (noting that "messages reportedly claimed, for example, that 'current management is
blind, stupid and incompetent.").
288. Id.
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third-party claim against ITEX and its executives. 9

The counterclaim

alleged that the corporate plaintiff was violating various securities laws, and
thus that the posted messages were essentially truew Not long after the
answer and counterclaim, "the Securities and Exchange Commission got
into the act."" ' Based on their investigation, on September 27, 1998, the
SEC brought292 a civil fraud action against ITEX and members of its
management.
3.

Could the Rumors Be True?: John Doe Does Discovery to Find Out

"Another tactic that should come as no surprise is the extent to which
John Doe defendants are trying to use the discovery process to bolster their
positions and embarrass the plaintiff companies and their executives" that
they have smeared.2 93 Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Felch,294 provides an
example of a John Doe using the discovery process to attempt to prove that

alleged cybersmears were actually true.2 95 In Varian, the plaintiff
corporation alleged that defendant Michangelo Delfino, a former research
scientist at Varian that had recently been fired, began posting defamatory
messages and impersonating company officials on a Yahoo! Finance
message board. 96
The defendant denied the allegations and asserted that the suit was

merely an attempt "to 'use the Internet to go after' his research and
development startup company,
MoBeta, Inc., which he [claimed was] the
'real target of Varian's suit."'2 97 Attempting to prove their theory, "lt]he
defendant's attorneys in the Varian case have deposed Varian's director of
human resources, its human resources senior resources representative, a

289. Id. "The answer containing the cross-complaint was amended." Id. (citing Itex v. French,
No. 98-09-06393 (Cir. Ct. Ore., County of Multnomah)).
290. Specifically, in the "amended pleading, the defendant alleged, in effect, that the creation and
issuance of bartering trade dollars in circumstances that the defendant contends were in deficit
condition constitute[d] an offering and sale of unregistered securities in supposed violation of
Oregon's blue sky laws." Id. (noting that in addition to requesting injunctive relief against ITEX and
a receivership for the exchange, "[t]he defendant sought damages on the various counterclaims and
third-party claims totaling more than $1.5 million dollars.").
291. Id.
292. Id. "The complaint alleged securities fraud and asserted that the company had materially
inflated its revenues and earnings in financial statements filed with the Commission and in other
disclosures made to the investing public." Id. (citing SEC Litig. Release No. 16305 (Sept. 28)).
293. Id.
294. No. C-99 20256 RMW ENE (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 25, 1999).
295. See Bell, supra note 284 (observing that "[t]he Varian suit is a virtual soap opera of charges
and counter-charges.").
296. Id.
297. According to the defendant, "'[w]hat we think they're trying to do is go after our patents."'
Id. (citing Erik Espe, Ex-Varian Employees Cry SLAPP, BUSINESS JOURNAL (San Jose and Silicon
Valley), Nov. 1, 1999).
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'
supervising manager and a manager."298
In the ultimate twist of irony,
corporate plaintiffs, placed in such a predicament, might have equally as
strong an incentive to prevent defendants from obtaining certain corporate
information through the discovery process as do John Does in maintaining

their anonymity.299
VII. CONCLUSION

As the Supreme Court in Reno observed, the Internet has reshaped the
scope of contemporary discourse by empowering every person possessing
online access with an equal opportunity to communicate "to an audience
3' °°
larger and more diverse than any the Framers could have imagined.
Underlying the argument that anonymous speech should not be stifled is the
optimistic, and perhaps naive, notion that in the "marketplace of ideas" all
ideas are of equal importance,"' and that anonymity plays an integral role in
fostering free expression.3 2 Although such anonymity may initially appear
to provide an idyllic medium of unparalleled equality and empowerment in
the realm of free speech, it is one that is ripe for abuse."'
The ability to remain unknown permits those who wish to exploit their
privilege to violate the rights of others while hiding under a veil of
anonymity lacking any form of accountability or responsibility.3 '
As
evidenced by the devastating consequences commonly caused due to
corporate cybersmear, online anonymity may encourage speech that perhaps
should have never been disseminated.'
Ultimately, a boiling point is
reached where the well-founded intent to create heightened participation in
public discourse simply comes at too great of a cost." More importantly,
298. Id. (noting that "[e]fforts reportedly are underway to depose other even more senior
executives.").
299. See id. (tending to suggest that, in many ways, litigation in corporate cybersmear cases can
be detrimental to both parties).
300. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
301. See Volokh, supra note 22, at 1086-87 (arguing that "[t]he perfect 'marketplace of ideas' is
one where all ideas, not just the popular or well-founded ones, are accessible to all.").
302. McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 (1994).
303. See Branscomb, supra note 25, at 1642 (noting that "the ability to remain unknown removes
many of the layers of civilized behavior as [Internet users] can escape responsibility for negligent or
abusive postings.").
304. See id.
305. See Smith, supra note 6, at 4 (arguing that "pseudonymity can provide speakers with the
courage to speak in ways that they might eschew if their words were easily traceable to them."); see
also LESSIG, supra note 37, at 80 (observing that "U]ust as anonymity might give you the strength to
state an unpopular view, it can also shield you if you post an irresponsible view. Or a slanderous
view. Or a hurtful view.").
306. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 902-903 (noting that "fostering a more participatory public

however, corporate cybersmear detracts from, rather than contributes to, the
marketplace of ideas by perpetuating disparaging falsehoods to the detriment
of corporations, shareholders, and the general public. 7
Although in many cases it is a difficult distinction, constitutionally
protected anonymous speech must be distinguished from unlawful
cybersmear."" Defamatory statements that are aimed at manipulating the
stock market or harming one's reputation simply have no value in the
marketplace of ideas."°

Instead, the pervasive spread of cybersmear

threatens to engulf the very premise upon which the metaphor was originally
based."
It is easy to sympathize with John Doe in his web-waged war against big

corporate America."' However, the rights of corporate plaintiffs victimized
by relentless cybersmear campaigns must also be recognized. Clearly,
corporate plaintiffs should not be permitted to abuse the discovery process
by filing frivolous suits that are merely aimed at unmasking an anonymous
critic as a scare tactic to chill continued criticism.3 2 But on the same token,
John Does should not be permitted to use their anonymity to shield

themselves from liability and leave a corporate plaintiff without a potential
defendant in the face of a legitimate cause of action. 3'

For the time being,

however, courts must continue to struggle in balancing the right of corporate
plaintiffs to pursue meritorious causes of action with the significant privacy
concerns of John Doe.' 4 In affording John Doe the process that he is due,
however, courts should not deny corporate plaintiffs the process they
deserve in seeking to silence a vicious critic." '
Corporate cybersmears raise significant issues of liability.3 6 Due to the
fact that most cases have been settled or dismissed, it remains unclear as to

discourse may come at a high cost. Speech from a 'multitude of tongues' may lead to truth, but it
may also lead to the Tower of Babel.").
307. See id. at 903 (reasoning that "discourse that has no necessary anchor in truth has no value to
anyone but the speaker, and the participatory nature of Internet threatens to engulf its value as
discourse.").
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that "[iut is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail .... ").
311. "In contemporary society, the individual is often overwhelmed by the size, wealth, and power
of impersonal organizations, both in the private and public sectors." Richard S. Miller, Tort Law
and Power: A Policy-OrientedAnalysis, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1069, 1076 (1994) (citing Allen M.
Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 51 CAN. B. REV. 155 (1973)).
312. See Boies, supra note 82, at 1210.
313. See Lidsky, supra note 23, at 881 (observing that "it is perfectly legitimate for plaintiffs to
seek to stop an onslaught of offensive and damaging untruths.").
314. See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
315. See id.
316. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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whether a cause of action for defamation will ultimately prove to be the most
successful tool for corporate plaintiffs seeking vindication." ' Presently, the
level of constitutional protection afforded to defendants in corporate
cybersmear

cases,

predicated

on

defamation,

remains

unresolved.3 8

Traditional principles fail to neatly conform to the novel issues presented by
the Internet and its uncharted waters."9 Rather, whether John Doe qualifies

as a media or nonmedia defendant, whether a corporation is a public or
private figure, and whether a cybersmear constitutes a matter of public or
private concern are just a few of the complex questions that lower courts are
left to address absent guidance from the Supreme Court."' Of particular
importance is how the message board context applies with respect to the
opinion privilege.'
Furthermore, it is questionable whether anti-SLAPP
statutes designed to limit frivolous defamation suits will pose a viable

procedural obstacle for corporate plaintiffs."
Moreover, for many cybersmeared corporations, litigation may not be
the answer.2 3 In addition to not making financial sense, corporations might
only be hurting themselves by suing John Doe.324 Perhaps these suits will
uncover an issue that will set in motion a regulatory response;.3 however,
their success in providing a viable means of redress for tortious conduct is
presently untested. Nevertheless, the defamation claim in cybersmear cases
remains arguably the best cause of action "until something better can be
found. '326

317.

See id.

318. See supra notes 168-203 and accompanying text.
319. See id.

320.
321.
322.
323.

See id.
See supra notes 204-18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 228-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 293-99 and accompanying text.

324. See id.

325. See Gary T. Schartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 385 (1994) (citing A.M. Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 51 CAN.
B. REV. 155 (1973)). "Moreover, if tort can feed into regulation, regulation can also feed into tort."
Id. Corporate plaintiffs, such as VirtualSellers.com, a Chicago software company who sued two
cybersmearers for posts that caused the company's stock price to fall, argue that "'[tihe regulations
should be changed so that people who want to post on the Internet have to disclose who they are."'
Lorek, supra note 18 (quoting Bill Sinclair, the president of VirtualSellers.com).
326. LINDEN, supra note 60, at 669. As Justice Linden observes:
"[D]efamation law is available to assist individuals whose reputations have been
besmirched by improper methods. Other remedies are available but they are often
inappropriate.... A defamation action, though certainly cumbersome and expensive,
may offer the best blend of deterrence and compensation, without unduly inhibiting free
speech. That is undoubtedly why the defamation action has survived and will continue to
flourish, despite its many obvious shortcomings. Just like other areas of tort law, it just
happens to serve our society and therefore is worthy of preservation until something
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The common thread in all corporate cybersmear cases turns on the
equipoise right of anonymous Internet users to post online messages, and the
right of corporate plaintiffs to protect themselves and their shareholders
from the potentially devastating consequences of such speech when it is

false. Amidst the vast array of legal questions for which there are currently
no answers, on this point courts have been quite clear." 7 As the Supreme
Court observed in McIntyre, "[t]he right to remain anonymous may be
abused when it shields fraudulent conduct. But... our society accords
greater weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its
misuse."32

Scot Wilson329

better can be found."
Id. (citations omitted).
327. "If there is one truism in the history of constitutional defamation privilege, it is that
'[w]hatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate."' Fetzer, supra note
186, at 38 (citing Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)), quoted in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
328. 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). See also United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), aft'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (noting that "the First Amendment... presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
authoritative selection. To many this is, and will always be, folly; but we have staked upon it our
all.").
329. J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law 2002. Note & Comment Editor,
Pepperdine Law Review. The author would like to thank Megan Gray of the Baker & Hostetler LLP
for her generous help and expert insight.
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